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This paper examines the role that media plays in the state building strategy of the Islamic 
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). It analyzes the ways in which ISIS spreads its message 
and determines the significance of that message as it relates to state formation. Research 
findings suggest that ISIS is a sophisticated organization driven by powerful religious and 
political ideas. This paper is thus a means of uncovering ISIS's own arguments and state 
building aspirations. Examination and analysis of ISIS publications, public statements, 
and social media posts (such as those found on Twitter, Youtube, and web forums) 
constitute the main methods of research for this report.  
 
Analysis of social media indicates that ISIS uses conventional social media platforms 
(such as Twitter and Youtube) as a primary means of media dissemination, making the 
distribution of its media decentralized. ISIS appears to be sacrificing strict control over 
the delivery of its message in exchange for widespread circulation and distribution. Pro-
ISIS social media accounts are arranged into hierarchical virtual networks that allow 
users to communicate and coordinate posts. ISIS's media campaign is thus well organized 
and relatively controlled.  
 
The content found in ISIS propaganda is particularly significant in understanding ISIS's 
current success and long-term goals. Media allows ISIS to demonstrate to its 
sympathizers that it not only has a post-war vision, but also a means of making that 
vision a reality. ISIS portrays itself as possessing many of the necessary features of 
modern statehood, including governance and legal structures, a viable economy, and the 
ability to provide basic and complex public services. ISIS also invests heavily in religious 
rhetoric, adding another layer to the group's appeal and overall legitimacy. Pro-ISIS 
media indicates that ISIS is not driven primarily by grand sectarian war or anti-western 
sentiment, but by a desire to restore the Islamic Caliphate. Global media, by helping ISIS 
to bolster its own political and religious legitimacy, contributes heavily to the 
actualization of its goals. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
He was born in 1971 in Samarra, Iraq, to a conservative Sunni family of Islamic 
preachers and classical Arabic teachers. He is highly educated, having received a PhD in 
Islamic studies from the University of Baghdad, and has been described as shy and 
deeply religious. Much of his past remains a mystery, but in less than a year, he has 
managed to become the world’s most powerful Islamist leader. This is Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed caliph of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), 
otherwise known simply as the Islamic State.1  
 Not much is known about Baghdadi, earning him the title, “the invisible sheikh.”2 
Only a few authenticated photographs exist of him, and, according to media sources, even 
his own followers do not interact with him directly.3 Baghdadi thus captured the world’s 
attention when, on July 4, 2014, he arrived at the Grand Mosque in Mosul, Iraq to deliver 
his first public sermon as leader of the newly restored Islamic Caliphate. Within hours, 
Baghdadi’s sermon was posted on the Internet, and images of Baghdadi slowly climbing 
the stairs of the pulpit dressed in a black robe and turban circulated global media. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, announced the formation of a 
unified Islamic Caliphate on June 29, 2014, thereby changing the group’s name from “the Islamic State of 
Iraq and al-Sham” to simply “the Islamic State.” For the purpose of this paper, I will continue to use the 
acronym “ISIS.”  
2 Benjamin Russel, "Who is Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi? The 'invisible sheikh' waging brutal war in Iraq," 
Express, June 12, 2014, accessed October 9, 2014, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/481968/Who-is-
Abu-Bakr-Al-Baghdadi-The-invisible-sheikh-waging-brutal-war-in-Iraq.  
3 Ibid.   
2	  	   	  
Baghdadi spoke calmly in classical Arabic before several dozen men and boys, who stood 
beneath the black ISIS flag draped on the wall next to them. In his sermon, Baghdadi 
defended his intention to establish an Islamic State, explaining, “this is a duty upon the 
Muslims-a duty that has been lost for centuries…the Muslims sin by losing it, and they 
must always seek to establish it, and they have done so, and all praise is due to Allah.”4 
In only a few short months, ISIS has become the most powerful and sophisticated 
insurgent organization in the world. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of Baghdadi delivering a sermon at the Grand Mosque in  
Mosul, Iraq on July 4, 2014.5 
 
 
Since June of 2014, ISIS has seized control of large swaths of territory between 
Raqqa, ISIS’s “capital” in northern Syria, Mosul in northern Iraq, and Fallujah, west of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Thomas Joscelyn, "Analysis: Islamic State's 'caliph' leader prayers in Mosul," The Long War Journal, July 
5, 2014, accessed September 10, 2014, 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/07/analysis_islamic_sta.php.  
5 “English subtitles of full sermon posted by ISIS’s Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, Caliph of the ‘Islamic State,’” 
Youtube video, posted by “D Brett,” July 12, 2014, accessed August 8, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxJSm7XwxqA.  
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Baghdad. While estimates vary, most sources report that ISIS controls nearly a third of 
both Syria and Iraq.6 Relentless violence and human rights atrocities have come to 
characterize ISIS’s method of operation. However, while the world maintains a state of 
horror, buttressed by images of beheadings and stonings, ISIS has managed to establish 
governance structures, schools, health centers, and a viable economy. One of ISIS’s 
media centers, al-Hayat, has launched a global propaganda campaign so alluring that 
thousands of fighters from all over the world have flocked to Syria and Iraq in defense of 
a romantic vision of the Islamic Caliphate. ISIS’s intellectual might and ability to posture 
itself as a legitimate state is what will make ISIS successful in the long run.  
The immediate military threat that ISIS poses is only the surface of the challenge. 
ISIS is not merely a group of terrorists; it is an organization driven by ideas and by what 
many of its members believe to be the command of God. Combating a group like ISIS, 
therefore, requires intellectual diplomacy. The goal of this paper is not merely to react to 
ISIS’s actions, but also to analyze ISIS’s own arguments and state building aspirations. 
Careful analysis of ISIS’s media campaign serves as the means through which I will 
accomplish this goal. I will both examine how ISIS spreads its message and analyze the 
significance of that message as it relates to state formation. This will allow me to gain a 
deeper understanding of ISIS’s post-war aims. In this way, I will add a new perspective 
to the current debate about the nature of the group, examining how, on the one hand, ISIS 
is a new kind of security threat, different from what we in the West have encountered in 
the past, and on the other hand, represents a body of beliefs as old as the seventh century.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Joscelyn, "Analysis: Islamic State's 'caliph' leader prayers in Mosul.” 
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This paper is not intended to bolster sympathy for ISIS or justify the group’s 
actions. Rather, it is a means of taking ISIS seriously, not just militarily, but 
intellectually. I plan to take ISIS under the microscope and examine the group from new 
and perhaps controversial angles in order to truly understand the driving forces behind 
ISIS. Through its media campaign, ISIS claims a degree of political and religious 
legitimacy to which other insurgent groups can hardly compare. It is thus vital that we 
understand how ISIS uses media as a weapon of statecraft.  
 
CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION  
 What role do media play in ISIS’s state building strategy? What do pro-ISIS 
media tell us about ISIS’s long-term goals? These central questions will guide my 
research and lead me to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of 
ISIS. This paper will address Iraqi and Syrian politics only as they relate to the 
emergence of ISIS. This paper will also not discuss in detail ISIS’s military strategy or 
foreign policies concerning ISIS, but will focus instead on characterizing ISIS’s political 
and ideological visions. First, I will provide an overview of the literature concerning state 
formation. In order to understand how and why ISIS functions, it is important to gain 
familiarity with some of the existing theories on the origins and development of early and 
modern states. This literature review will cover five theories concerning state formation: 
conquest theory, voluntary theory, war theory, and media theory.  
 The next section of this paper will examine the evolution and emergence of ISIS 
by describing the historical and political environment in which ISIS developed. These 
5	  	   	  
chapters will focus primarily on the emergence of ISIS within the contexts of the Syrian 
Civil War and political instability in Iraq. I will begin by describing the activities of al-
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004 under the leadership of Abu Masab al-Zarqawi. I will then 
trace the evolution of AQI to the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq, which would 
later become, under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State of Iraq and 
al-Sham. I will also discuss the emergence of al-Qaeda in Syria and the point at which 
ISIS broke away from al-Qaeda and became an independent organization. Until February 
of 2014, ISIS existed under the banner of al-Qaeda, which first began operating in Syria 
in 2012 under the name Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). The split between JN and ISIS in 2014, 
however, marked the beginning of a violent rivalry between the two groups. I will thus 
analyze how and why the split occurred so that I might begin to characterize ISIS better 
and understand what makes ISIS distinct. 
In the next section of this paper, I will attempt to characterize the philosophy 
behind ISIS and the Islamic Caliphate more generally. How, for example, does Baghdadi 
justify the Caliphate and what is the historical and theological significance of the Islamic 
Caliphate? Answering this question will require an examination of the first Islamic 
Caliphate. I will also provide an overview of the contemporary debates regarding the 
restoration of the Caliphate. The first Islamic Caliphate was established in 632 AD and 
rose and fell until its final demise in 1924. The leader of a caliphate, the caliph, was and 
still is meant to be the shadow of the Prophet Muhammad, capable of implementing the 
same system of governance that existed during the Prophet's time. Baghdadi's 2014 
declaration of the Islamic Caliphate thus represents a desire to emulate a system that 
6	  	   	  
ruled the Muslim world nearly 15 centuries ago. In order to understand Baghdadi's role as 
Caliph, I will trace this role back to Abu Bakr, who was given the first title of caliph 
following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Abu Bakr was one of four caliphs known 
as the "Rashidun," or "Rightly Guided Caliphs." The Rightly Guided Caliphs are known 
to have shared a close, personal relationship with the Prophet Muhammad, and are 
therefore looked upon as models of perfect and righteous Islamic state leadership.  
What then, according to the example of the Rashidun, does it mean to be caliph? 
While Baghdadi was the first to officially declare the establishment of the Caliphate since 
1924, many radical Islamist leaders have informally declared themselves caliphs. Al-
Qaeda, for example, has publicly advocated the re-establishment of the Caliphate in 
rhetoric throughout its history. Despite such rhetoric, the idea of the Caliphate has not 
driven the group's agenda. ISIS is therefore unique in its ability and desire to turn its 
vision of a re-established Islamic Caliphate into a political reality. This section will thus 
end with a brief overview of some of the contemporary debates regarding the restoration 
of the Caliphate.  
Following an in-depth examination of the Caliphate, I will analyze ISIS’s media 
strategy. I begin by looking at how ISIS disseminates its media. ISIS is known for its 
adept use of social media platforms and modern technology as a means of 
communicating with its sympathizers abroad. Platforms such as Twitter and Youtube 
have proven powerful instruments of ISIS statecraft and play an incredibly significant 
role in ISIS’s larger political strategy. This chapter provides a glimpse at the inner 
workings of ISIS’s media strategy and analyzes ISIS’s overall approach to the Internet. 
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The next chapter will examine some of the theological themes present in ISIS’s 
official publications. Recognizing these themes is a necessary step towards understanding 
ISIS’s claim to religious authority. Religious authority, in turn, bolsters ISIS’s image as a 
legitimate caliphate. This section thus looks at how ISIS’s theological vision, as 
presented in its media campaign, factors into ISIS’s overall method of state building. I 
also provide a brief chapter on how public displays of violence fit into ISIS’s overall 
strategy. ISIS is perhaps more widely known for its merciless brutality. While ISIS’s use 
of violence is not the main focus of this paper, I nevertheless demonstrate that all of 
ISIS’s decisions, even those that require the use of violence, are highly calculated and 
motivated by ISIS’s long-term goals.  
 In the next chapter, I will analyze how ISIS presents itself as a functioning state 
through its media campaign. How does ISIS claim to be governing the territories under 
its control? I will analyze ISIS’s use of aesthetics, symbols, and rhetoric to determine 
what ISIS is hoping to project or accomplish. This chapter is organized according to the 
various state-like functions and features ISIS claims to possess. Through ISIS self-
reporting, I examine ISIS’s ability to provide public services and security forces, 
establish educational institutions, promote the role of women, build complex legal 
structures, and provide economic stability. The aim of this chapter is to assess the degree 
to which these various functions contribute to ISIS’s overall legitimacy.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Secondary Research 
 
Secondary desk research, stemming from both print and online sources, will 
contribute heavily to the research methodology of this paper. A number of book titles by 
distinguished authors will provide useful background information concerning the nature 
of the original Islamic state and the intended role of the Caliph, for example. I will also 
use a number of publications and journals that cover relevant topics, many of which I 
found through various databases, scholarly magazines, and prominent think tanks.  
 
Primary and Original Research 
 
 The bulk of my research on ISIS itself will stem from original and primary 
sources. Given that the emergence of ISIS in international politics is so recent, most of 
my information concerning ISIS developments will stem not from books, but from print, 
online, and audio media.  
 
- English and Arabic Newspaper Articles 
 
Like social media, English and Arabic newspaper articles will be vital to tracking 
developments concerning ISIS. Arabic newspapers in particular will allow me to analyze 
how Arab countries perceive these developments.  
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- Social Media 
 
One of the best ways to track rebel movements and statements made by Islamist 
leaders is through social media. Rebel and Islamist groups in Syria, particularly ISIS, are 
notorious for communicating with each other, and the broader jihadist community, 
through social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, blogs, and jihadi web 
forums. Through jihadi blogs and web forums in particular I will have access to some of 
the conversations currently taking place within the jihadi community regarding ISIS. 
Activists working on the ground in Syria and Iraq also report through social media. Thus, 
in order to closely track current events, I will follow various Facebook and Twitter 
accounts, bearing in mind that social media sites are often used as a political tool or a 
way of disseminating propaganda. Much of the social media coming out of Syria and Iraq 
is biased, but this in itself can offer insight on the mindset of these Islamist groups and 
their members. Due to the potential dangers associated with visiting jihadi web forums 
and pro-ISIS social media accounts, I will use a proxy server provided by Top Browser, 
which acts as an intermediary between my personal computer and the Internet. This, in 
turn, will allow me to browse the Internet with a relative degree of anonymity.  
 
- ISIS Publications and Propaganda  
 
ISIS has become well known for its outstanding media campaign, coordinated and 
disseminated through ISIS's many formal media centers. Through its media centers, ISIS 
has been able to publish and disperse a number of publications that document ISIS 
achievements and advertise its broad military and political strategy. I will carefully 
examine these publications, including Dabiq, ISIS's English-language magazine, and the 
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frequently published "Islamic State Report," as a means of analyzing ISIS's political and 
religious vision. ISIS has also circulated a number of self-made videos, flyers, and short 
publications that advertise the Islamic Caliphate to the Muslim community elsewhere in 
the world, including in the West. ISIS has become well known for its propaganda, which 
has drawn hundreds of foreign fighters from all over the world into Syria to fight 
alongside ISIS. Careful analysis of the aesthetics and rhetoric used in ISIS media will be 
crucial to my research.  
 
- Public Statements 
 
I will keep a consistent record of public statements and speeches made by ISIS 
leaders and members, paying close attention to the rhetoric used and how such rhetoric 
relates to the group's objectives and ideology. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's public sermon 
delivered in Mosul on July 4, 2014 is among the many audio and print statements I will 
carefully analyze. Such statements are frequently circulated on the Internet, either 
formally through ISIS media centers, or informally through social media sites.  
 
 
Websites: Monitoring and Analysis  
 
 A number of online blogs and websites dedicated to monitoring Islamist activity 
will prove vital to my research. I will conduct a lot of my research with the help of sites 
such as SITE Intelligence Group (specifically the group's "INSITE Blog on Terrorism" 
and "SITE Monitoring Service: Jihadist Threat"), TRAC, Jihadica, and Jihadology. These 
monitoring services track, compile, analyze, and occasionally translate information 
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coming from jihadist websites and blogs, videos, and social media. They will prove 
crucial in my endeavor to closely track pro-ISIS media.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 While we have seen calls for the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate throughout 
the twentieth century, an Islamist group has not threatened modern nation-state borders in 
the way that ISIS has. Unlike other militant Islamist organizations, ISIS expects to 
establish a sustainable, fully functioning state. This paper will serve as a means of 
moving beyond daily media coverage pertaining to ISIS, which appears focused on 
ISIS’s use of extreme violence and brutality. I plan to look beyond the headlines and 
beneath the surface of ISIS, where one will likely find a smart and sophisticated 
organization driven by historically and religiously inspired ideas. Only by confronting 
these ideas head on and examining how these ideas manifest themselves in the form of a 
state can we truly begin to understand and combat groups like ISIS.  	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2. Literature Review  
 
 
STATE FORMATION 
 
Since the Second World War, the number of states in the world has quadrupled, 
making the nature and origin of the state a subject of increasing interest in political 
science, sociology, and anthropology.1 Over time, scholars have developed a wide range 
of theories explaining the formation of the state. Such theories have developed 
significance in the way that they impact the legitimacy of existing states and the basis on 
which existing governments claim authority.2 The variation in state formation theories 
stems from disagreement over what it is that constitutes a state in the first place, whether 
it is a system of formal institutions, a mechanism of dominance and authority, or merely 
an association of peoples. At the most basic level, and for the purposes of this paper, the 
state can be defined as having the following components: a permanent population, a 
defined territory, and a centralized government.3 Given this definition, we can begin to 
examine various theories concerning the formation of the state, that is, the development 
of state structures in an area where no effective state previously existed. 
 Generally speaking, state formation theories can be divided into two areas of 
study: early state formation and modern state formation. Early state formation concerns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Christian Krohn-Hansen and Nunstad G. Knut, "Introduction," in State Formation: Anthropological 
Perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 3. 
2 Martin Sicker, The Genesis of the State (New York: Praeger, 1991), 19.  
3 H. J. M. Clasessen and Peter Skalnik, "The Early State: Theories and Hypotheses," in The Early State 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 17.  
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the study of primitive forms of social organization. According to Fukuyama, most human 
civilizations began as tribal societies defined in terms of kinship.4 The evolution of 
primitive tribal societies into organized polities is the subject of early state formation. 
Theories concerning early state formation typically stem from the anthropological study 
of Africa, Mesopotamia, South and East Asia, and Peru.5 Prominent scholars such as 
Oppenheimer, Carneiro, and Wittfogel are vital to the development of early state 
formation theories. 
 Theories on modern state formation begin with the study of medieval Europe and 
continue through the periods of colonization and decolonization. Modern statehood is 
often associated with the Westphalian model of sovereignty, which requires that a state 
has sovereign authority over a given territory and is not controlled by any external 
actors.6 Fukuyama asserts that changes in ideology also marked the shift from early 
statehood to modern statehood. He explains: 
The passage from band- and tribal-level societies to state-level ones 
represented, in some sense, a huge setback for human freedom. States 
were wealthier and more powerful than their kin-based predecessors, but 
that wealth and power led to a huge amount of stratification that left some 
masters and many others slaves.7  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (London: Profile Books, 2011), 53.  
5 Ronald Cohen, "State Origins: A Reappraisal," in H. J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik, The Early State 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 39.  
6 Stephen D. Krasner, "Rulers and Ruled: Minority Rights," in Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 73.  
7 Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 445. 
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The rise of modernism, however, meant the rise of "equality and recognition" at the level 
of the state.8 Theorists such as Tilly, Weber, and Tyler contribute heavily to the 
scholarship on modern state formation.  
 Most theories concerning the origins of the state, early and modern, revolve 
around human agency in state formation. During the Hellenistic period, however, the 
state was widely considered a divine, rather than human, creation. As Sicker explains, 
ancient Greek thinkers viewed the state and its institutions as an extension of human 
nature, and therefore a concern of the gods. The Greeks' conception of the nature of the 
state "led them to consider the state more as an end in itself than as a means for furthering 
human purposes. As a consequence, the state took on a significance that dwarfed that of 
its citizens who, for the most part, submitted docilely to its virtually unlimited 
authority."9 The theocratic conception of the state is thus associated with some of the 
earliest societies in which political authority was derived from God(s) alone. Political 
power was legitimized by the common belief that certain individuals were agents of the 
divine. In his analysis of early state formation, Service discusses the divine origin of the 
state as proposed by Greek and Roman philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, 
and the Epicureans. Service explains: 
During the Revival of Learning in Europe from the thirteenth to fifteenth 
century, Aristotle's idea of natural law to be fulfilled in terms of an ideal 
universal state, or cosmopolis, was united with Stoic philosophical thought 
to become finally theistic, particularly on the basis of "natural" (i.e. God-
given) desirability of the state.10  	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9 Sicker, The Genesis of the State, 20.  
10 Elman R. Service, Origins of the State and Civilization (New York: Norton, 1975), 22.   
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Modern sociologists and political scientists, however, view the divine theory of state 
formation as deeply flawed and largely irrelevant in explaining most instances of state 
formation. Service, for example, discounts the divine theory as "antirevolutionary, 
antideterministic, and antiscientific."11 Sicker notes:  
By stipulating that all power derives from God, the theory allows anyone 
who aspires to political power to assert that his inclinations are also of 
divine origin and of equal standing with that of the established political 
authorities, entitling him to the same legitimacy irrespective of prevailing 
law or custom in a particular political society.12  
 
This idea stems from Ibn Khaldun, who argues, "human society can exist without such a 
Divine Law, merely in virtue of the authority which compels the others to follow and 
obey him."13 Most agree, then, that divine agency alone is not sufficient to explain how 
and why states formed throughout history. This following literature review explains more 
widely credited theories, some of which relate, directly and indirectly, to the divine 
theory of state formation. The theories discussed concern both early state formation 
(including conquest theory and voluntary theory) and modern state formation (including 
warfare theory, culture theory, and media theory.)  
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12 Sicker, 41.  
13 Charles Philip Issawi, An Arab Philosophy of History (Princeton, NJ, USA: Darwin Press, 1987), 101, 
quoted in Sicker, Origins of the State and Civilization, 40.  
 
16	  	   	  
CONQUEST THEORY 
 Scholars have taken a number of approaches to explaining the conquest theory, 
sometimes referred to as the “force theory,” but some of the earliest theories take a 
socioeconomic approach. At the most basic level, the conquest or force theory of state 
formation holds that states form as a result of the dominance of one particular group over 
another. While the conquest theory has its roots in the work of Ibn Khaldun, Ludwig 
Gumplowicz is widely considered to be one of the first sociologists to develop the 
conquest theory using anthropological evidence. According to Gumplowicz, the origin of 
the state rests in the social stratification of society. Gumplowicz observed that early 
societies were divided into two broad social classes, namely, the conquerors and the 
conquered masses. The conquering class was motivated primarily by material gains 
achieved by exploiting the subjugated class. So as to maintain its dominance, the ruling 
class built institutions around this divided society, forming what we now know to be the 
state.  
Following closely in Gumplowicz’s footsteps was Franz Oppenheimer, one of the 
leading sociologists of the modern era to explain and analyze state formation according to 
the conquest theory. Oppenheimer argues that all primitive states arose following the use 
of force. According to Oppenheimer: 
The State…is a social institution, forced by a victorious group of men on a 
defeated group, with the sole purpose of regulating the dominion of the 
victorious group over the vanquished, and securing itself against the revolt 
from within and attack from abroad.14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Franz Oppenheimer, The State, (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975), 8, quoted in Sicker, 70.  
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Thomas Holland similarly characterizes the state in terms of force and domination, 
defining the state as: 
 A numerous assemblage of human beings generally occupying a certain 
territory amongst whom the will of the majority, or of an ascertainable 
class of persons is, by the strength of such a majority or class, made to 
prevail against any of their number who oppose it."15  
 
Thus, the purpose of the state according to these scholars is to secure the dominance of 
the ruling class over the subjugated masses. The state was, in its origin, an instrument of 
oppression. 
In The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, Frederick Engels 
similarly views conquest as the primary method of state formation, but examines why and 
under what circumstances conquest happens in the first place. Engels' thesis rests on the 
idea that force is a consequence of economic development and stratification. Engels' 
argument begins with primitive societies. As economies began to develop, Engels argues, 
people established new modes of production and traditional social structures began to 
change. Distinct social classes and sects formed, distinguished primarily by the 
possession of land and modes of production. By establishing control over the economy, 
the possessing class is then able to rule over the non-possessing class, and, as Krader 
notes, "the means by which this control is achieved is political force, including physical 
power. The highest (that is, most centralized), tightest, and most monopolistic control of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Thomas Erskine Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence (6th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893), 40, 
quoted in Sicker, Origins of the State and Civilization, 69.  
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the political power resides in the state, which is the organ of the ruling class."16 Like 
Gumplowicz, Oppenheimer, and Holland, Engels views the state as a mechanism for 
preserving a certain social order. In his review of Engels' thesis, Sicker assesses that "the 
primary purpose of the state…is to consolidate the existing class divisions of the society 
and thereby to ensure the security of the property of the dominant class."17 Engels’ 
emphasizes internal socioeconomic division as the precursor to state formation by force. 
This implies that the state arose out of force or conquest from within society rather than 
from some external force.  
In his analysis of Chinese dynasties, Fukuyama asserts that economic or material 
interests alone cannot explain the use of force in state formation. He argues that 
throughout human history, the use of force "has often been perpetuated by people seeking 
not material wealth but recognition." Recognition, Fukuyama states, is "the 
acknowledgement of another human being's dignity or worth, or what is otherwise 
understood as status." Fukuyama goes on to explain that recognition is not just sought 
after by conquerors, but also by what he calls "humble peasant rebels," such as Arab 
tribes which were able to "settle their differences and conquer much of North Africa and 
the Middle East because they sought recognition for their religion, Islam, much as 
European warriors conquered the New World under the banner of Christianity."18 
According to Fukuyama, then, the formation of the state by force stems not just from 
economic interests, but from ideological interests as well. Following from a similar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Lawrence Krader, Formation of the State (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 44-45.  
17 Sicker, Origins of the State and Civilization, 72.  
18 Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 441.  
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argument, Benedetto Croce broadens the definition of conquest to include not just 
physical force or military might, but also the power of persuasion and the exertion of 
intellectual pressure. In his assessment of Croce’s thesis, Sicker explains, "Whoever 
possess the power to persuade must be considered as a force in society."19   
 William Lilly argues that successful state formation requires a combination of 
physical force and a widely accepted ideology. In First Principles in Politics, Lilly 
argues, "Every polity, however rude, requires the ideas of right, and of law for the 
maintenance of right. Might, without these ideas, would not give rise to a commonwealth, 
but to a gang of robbers; to anarchy plus the sword."20 In other words, while conquest 
may be a contributing factor to state formation, force alone is not sufficient to 
establishing a sustainable state. Force and might must be backed by ideas concerning 
right and wrong, and a system capable of implementing those ideas.  
  Carneiro argues that the force theory of state formation only applies under certain 
conditions, noting that many instances of warfare throughout history did not lead to the 
creation of a state.21 Carneiro presents what he calls “environmental” and “social 
circumscription” theories. Both theories of circumscription describe the isolation of a 
society. Environmental circumscription refers to a situation in which a population is 
geographically isolated within a confined area, surrounded by natural boundaries such as 
mountains, bodies of water, or deserts. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Sicker, Origins of the State and Civilization, 75.  
20 Samuel William Lilly, Lilly, First Principles in Politics (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1899), 19.  
21 R. L. Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origin of the State," Science 169, no. 3947 (1970): 734, accessed 
September 30, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1729765?seq=1. 
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 Social circumscription describes a society isolated not because of natural 
boundaries, but because of human barriers. Carneiro explains that a society might find 
itself surrounded by rival or warring populations or tribes, preventing the isolated society 
from growing geographically. Following population growth, however, the isolated 
society likely faces extreme pressure to expand, forcing the society into conflict with 
surrounding tribes. Conquest thus becomes inevitable, according to Carneiro, and the 
conquered, if they seek survival, are forced to submit to the rule of their conquerors. 
Under conditions of social circumscription, Carneiro argues, the conquest theory of state 
formation may apply.  
 
VOLUNTARY THEORY 
Most voluntary theories of state formation extend from the social contract model 
first proposed by Enlightenment philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas 
Hobbes, and Immanuel Kant. The social contract model of political legitimacy suggests 
that individuals have willingly given up their autonomy to some higher authority in 
exchange for protection. Carneiro’s explanation of the voluntary theory closely reflects 
the social contract model. Carneiro defines all voluntary theories as being similar in that 
"they demonstrated inability of autonomous political units to relinquish their sovereignty 
in the absence of overriding external constraints."22 Carneiro thus suggests that given 
certain external constraints, “autonomous political units” willingly and voluntarily give 
up their sovereignty to the authority of the state. According to Carneiro, the voluntary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid.  
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theory of state formation holds that "at some point in their history, certain peoples 
spontaneously, rationally, and voluntarily gave up their individual sovereignties and 
united with other communities to form a larger political unit deserving to be called a 
state."23  
 Though Carneiro supports the conquest theory of state formation under conditions 
of social circumscription, other conditions, specifically conditions of environmental 
circumscription, better support the voluntary theory of state formation. In “A Theory of 
the Origin of the State,” Carneiro begins by describing one theory of voluntary state 
formation, or what he calls the “automatic theory,” first introduced by British 
archeologist V. Gordon Childe. According to the automatic theory, as agriculture 
developed in primitive societies and food was produced in surplus, people no longer had 
to produce their own food. People came to specialize in other forms of production, and 
the division of labor was established. Due to the division of labor, society became more 
economically and politically integrated, demanding certain institutions and organizational 
structures. Such structures are what we now know to be the state.  
 Carneiro argues, however, that the automatic theory alone is not sufficient in 
describing the formation of the state, noting that states have, throughout history, formed 
even in cases where agriculture did not create a food surplus. Carneiro thus introduces the 
voluntary theory of state formation under conditions of environmental circumscription. 
As previously explained, environmental circumscription occurs when a society becomes 
geographically isolated by natural boundaries. As population increases, resources become 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid, 733.  
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constrained. Eventually, people begin searching for a means of cooperation and 
organized distribution of limited resources. The desperate need for resources, Carneiro 
suggests, leads people to voluntarily submit to some organized structure or means of 
cooperation, which we might consider the beginnings of early statehood.24  
 One of the most notable theories concerning early state formation is the 
“hydraulic hypothesis,” developed largely by Karl Wittfogel. Wittfogel, like Carneiro, 
asserts that early populations voluntarily submitted to the authority of the state in 
exchange for the preservation and distribution of a particular resource. In Oriental 
Despotism, Wittfogel begins by examining ancient civilizations. He observes that most 
ancient civilizations relied heavily on irrigation and large-scale water supplies, and that 
the effective management of irrigation required an organized system of cooperation. This 
is where the state began to take shape. According to Wittfogel, state formation occurs 
when: 
A number of farmers eager to conquer arid lowlands and plains are forced 
to invoke the organizational devices which- on the basis of premachine 
technology- offer the one chance of success: they must work in 
cooperation with their fellows and subordinate themselves to a directing 
authority.25  
 
Wittfogel thus asserts that the state formed around society’s stock of water, a resource of 
common interest. Wittfogel also observes that while the hydraulic theory implies state 
formation occurred according to the will of the people, states often produced despotic 
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25 Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A comparative study of total power (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1957), 18.   
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governments, with one person or a small group of people claiming a monopoly on the 
control of irrigation and governance. However, despotism in such states, Wittfogel 
argues, was both legitimized by claims to religious authority, and considered necessary to 
the effective maintenance of water systems. Water supply thus became completely 
dependent on the state. Wittfogel notes, however, that while the hydraulic theory applies 
to early state formation, not all states throughout history formed around systems of 
irrigation.26 Wittfogel thus applies his analysis to modern state formation by 
characterizing the state as an entity or system meant to manage any particular resource of 
common interest.  
Elman Service’s theory on state formation requires a nuanced understanding of 
the voluntary theory. According to Service, states do not emerge out of common material 
interests, but out of association, or out of a common interest in a particular social order. 
In Origins of the State and Civilization, Service describes what he calls “chiefdoms,” or 
primitive societies characterized by primitive and theocratic rule. Service explains: 
Chiefdoms have centralized direction, hereditary hierarchical stratus 
arrangements with an aristocratic ethos, but no formal, legal apparatus of 
repression. The organization seems universally to be theocratic, and the 
form of submission to authority that of a religious congregation to a priest-
chief.27  
 
Though power is highly concentrated with the chiefdom’s leader, Service argues, “The 
leader’s position is strengthened by his doing the job well and fairly.”28 Institutions and 
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27 Service, Origins of the State and Civilization, 16.  
28 Ibid, 293.  
24	  	   	  
sanctions “backed by the use of force, or the threat of it,”29 form around this type of 
leadership, and this, according to Service, is where the state begins to form. Service 
explains that those living under the leader voluntarily submit to the state after the leader 
"engineers the consent of the governed by the adroit use of supernatural powers.”30 It is 
thus believed that "the benefit of being part of the society (which) obviously outweighed 
the alternatives."31 According to Service's theory, then, the state forms when people 
voluntarily submit to a leader that they believe to be not only beneficial, but an agent of 
the divine. 
Unlike Service, Herbert Spencer sees the state as stemming not from belief in or 
commitment to a particular leader, but from formal and informal welfare systems. In his 
analysis of state formation, Spencer distinguishes between two types of societies: militant 
societies and industrial societies. The industrial society, Spencer explains, is more 
progressive and complex than the militant society. The industrial society is defined by the 
rise of traders, merchants, and new modes of production, giving society’s members 
“freedom to experiment and enrich themselves.”32 States stemming from industrial 
societies, according to Spencer, form around voluntary alliances and social obligations. 
While Spencer sees state formation primarily as a consequence of warfare, he also views 
the state as a system "which directly seeks and subserves the welfare of the individual."33 
Therefore, in the industrial society Spencer describes, individuals view statehood as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Claessen and Skalnik, “The Early State: Theories and Hypotheses,” 16.  
30 Service, Origins of the State and Civilization, 294.  
31 Ibid, 301.  
32 John Offer, Herbert Spencer: Critical Assessments, Volume 4 (London: Routledge, 2000), 163.  
33 Service, Origins of the State and Civilization, 39.  
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mechanism for preserving their personal interests, and consequently choose to submit to 
the state system.  
 
WARFARE THEORY  
 In the militant society, however, Spencer attributes political evolution and the 
development of the state primarily to warfare. A militant society is one that "imposes 
authority upon its members" and is "designed for war with other societies.”34 It is also a 
society in which "the individual is subordinated to the collectivity."35 Unlike conquest 
theory, warfare theory rests on external conflict between societies rather than between 
internal social classes or individuals. Warfare, Spencer explains, requires cooperation, 
and efficient cooperation requires the subjugation of society to the command of a 
governing authority. In early modern states, this structure influenced the establishment of 
similar forms of cooperation in all areas of civil and political life.  
 Spencer develops the theory of “social Darwinism,” whereby warfare favors 
stronger and more efficient societies over weaker, less organized societies, which are 
often overrun by the stronger societies.36 Societies would not be militarily strong and 
efficient, however, if it were not for the prevalence of war more generally. As Service 
explains, “it is the prevalence of successful warfare in a state that leads to the prevalence 
of military institutions, which carry their influence over to peacetime.”37 If war, or the 	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threat of war, is continuous, society becomes increasingly dependent on the state, and the 
state, as governor of the military, becomes stronger and more centralized.  
 The origins of the warfare theory of state formation can be traced to Charles Tilly. 
In Coercion, Capital, and European States, Tilly examines the European experience in 
state formation. He notes that military development and innovation in pre-modern Europe 
made fighting wars very expensive, and that only the wealthiest states with the most 
capital could afford to pay for their own security. Powerful, centralized states thus 
developed so as to concentrate resources in the event of war. According to Tilly, 
"relations among states, especially through war and preparation for war, strongly affected 
the entire process of state formation."38 The conditions and resources needed to fight 
wars, however, often required the restructuring of society. Thus, the subsequent state 
formation “was often the product of bargaining, cooptation, legitimation, and sheer 
coercion between state-makers and societal forces…"39 The strength of the state 
depended on the extent to which it was able to extract resources from its own people in 
order to wage war, resulting in “distinct organizations that control the chief concentrated 
means of coercion within well-defined territories, and exercise priority in some respects 
over all other organization operating within those territories."40 
Tilly explains, however, that state-makers, the wielders of coercion, in order to 
most effectively concentrate their means of making war, found themselves obliged to 	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manage those they were deriving their resources from. Such states thus became involved 
in “extraction of resources, distribution of goods, services, and income, and adjudication 
of disputes."41 States also needed certain formal structures capable of extracting the 
means of war. Tilly describes the buildup of infrastructure for taxation as being vital to 
war preparation, as all state leaders had to find a way to finance wars. Tilly also 
acknowledges, however, that state structures vary, which Tilly attributes to variation in 
the relationship between capital and coercion. For example, states with a limited 
concentration of capital, marked by a weak urban market economy, faced a more 
imminent threat of invasion from surrounding powers. This led to "the formation of states 
founded on the elaboration of a strong, internal state power" and followed a more 
"'coercion-intensive' path of development."42 Ultimately, however, Tilly argues, 
"Extraction and struggle over the means of war created the central organization structures 
of the state."43  
According to Roberts, however, military revolutions, rather than state-makers, 
contributed to the formation of the state. Roberts looks to sixteenth and seventeenth 
century Europe to demonstrate his hypothesis, arguing that the nature of war in Europe 
changed drastically during this time period. He first highlights changes in military tactics 
and developments in military technology, pointing specifically to the emergence of 
portable firearms. As military technology advanced, there grew a need for more skilled 
and well-trained troops. The size and professionalism of armies thus expanded. As 	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militaries became larger and more sophisticated, military strategies became increasingly 
complex. Certain administrative functions thus became necessary in order to keep 
militaries organized and well financed in the face of the newly complex and war-ridden 
surrounding environment. Government institutions, Roberts argues, took on this 
administrative role. The state, therefore, by building up military and disciplinary 
structures, was the only unity capable of enduring the general chaos and violence of 
European warfare.  
As Rasler and Thompson emphasize, the warfare theory of state formation rests 
largely on foreign policy concerns. States had to organize and build up their militaries in 
order to protect themselves from threats posed by surrounding states. “Tough 
neighborhoods,” Rasler and Thompson argue, “mean that everyone had to play the same 
realpolitik game, lest they be overrun by a local conqueror."44 Ironically, as Rasler and 
Thompson point out, “the more successful a state's resource mobilization for warfare, the 
more tempting the ambitious foreign policy schemes became."45 From here, Rasler and 
Thompson make a number of proposals. First, they argue, “The greater the perceived 
external threat, the more likely a state is to develop and maintain a high level of domestic 
power inequality."46 This stems from the idea that in order to ward off a potential threat, 
the state must have the ability to extract resources from the people, which in turn requires 
the concentration of state power. Therefore, “the greater the level of domestic power 	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inequality, the less likely a state is to democratize.”47 Following from this argument then, 
the greater a state's level of democratization, the more constrained a state is in dealing 
with foreign conflicts.  
Schmitt expands the warfare theory further by tracing state formation and 
development to human diversity. Diverse identities and subgroups, Schmitt argues, give 
rise to conflict and hostility, eventually leading to war. Political entities, or states, form as 
a means of managing hostility between diverse societies. Schmitt writes specifically 
about the modern era, in which irregular combatants and non-state actors, rather than 
states themselves, are engaged in warfare. The concentration of power with the state, 
according to Schmitt, has thus become necessary in order to re-establish a level of order 
and control over the way wars are fought.  
Like Schmitt, Anslo argues that the state formed as a means of fighting chaos and 
imposing order. Ironically, Anslo argues, the very root of chaos lies with societies’ 
intention to impose order. According to Anslo, "The historically and socially constructed 
struggle against chaos (or terrorism, or barbarism, or impurity) makes it not only possible 
but also indeed necessary to view the deployment of force and violence as a legitimate 
part of the fight."48 Anslo analyzes eighteenth and nineteenth century Mexico and 
concludes that the line between a society characterized by anarchy and disarray, and one 
characterized by order and civility, is maintained by violence and war. Further, “the 
forms of modern state violence may vary considerably from one society to another, in 
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part as a product of how governments and state institutions seek to divert, fight, and 
control what they view as threats and dangers."49 
Anderson explains the formation of the state by offering a nuanced understanding 
of the warfare theory. After the Second World War, Anderson argues, territorial 
competition between states diminished as modern states became economically and 
politically dependent on one another. “States,” according to Anderson, “particularly the 
highly industrialized states, have become so locked to one another that territorial 
competition between them has become impractical and irrelevant."50 Warfare theory, 
then, as it applies to the modern era, relies not on physical conflict, but on ideological 
competition in which states fight to gain political, economic, or ideological influence. 
Anderson looks specifically to the interaction between the United States and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War to support his hypothesis. "The competition between the 
superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union,” Anderson explains, “from the 
closing stages of the Second World War to the mid-1980s, was not so much to gain 
sovereign control of territory, but a struggle for territorial spheres of influence."51 
Anderson thus attributes ideological warfare to the formation and development of the 
modern state.  
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CULTURE THEORY  
 Anderson also supports the culture theory of state formation by arguing that 
identity and feelings of unity are central to state development. Durkheim, however, is 
often regarded as one of the first theorists to take a sociological approach to 
understanding state formation. For Durkheim, material interests cannot be the sole 
determinants of the progress of the state. Durkheim introduces what he calls the 
"conscious collective" as a factor in state formation. The conscious collective, Durkheim 
explains, is a type of social unity or solidarity defined by common beliefs or interests. 
Primitive societies, according to Durkheim, can be described as systems of segmented 
entities connected by the conscious collective, or “mechanical solidarity.” From the 
beginning, according to Durkheim, religion was central to social solidarity and the 
subsequent nature of the state. He argues, for example, "It is from religion that have 
emerged, through successive transformations, all the other manifestations of collective 
activity - law, morality, art, science, political forms, etc. In the beginning, everything was 
religious."52  
 Culture and tradition at the level of society, then, greatly influence how the state 
develops. For Anderson, the relationship between the state and society is critical to state 
formation. Anderson examines the development of state frontiers, or the physical 
boundaries of the state. According to Anderson, culture and collective identity are the 
primary determinants of state frontiers. Though identity is a broad and often ambiguous 
term, Anderson clarifies, "Locality, social class, language, ethnicity, and religion have 	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also been the basis of deeply rooted identities."53 State frontiers, according to Anderson, 
are markers of a collective identity and are “part of political beliefs and myths about the 
unity of the people, and sometimes myths about the 'natural' unity of a territory."54 State 
borders are thus often tied to a historical narrative concerning social unity.   
 Anderson acknowledges that in the modern era, disputes about state frontiers are 
often considered "a relic from the past."55 However, "territorial ideologies," or ideas that 
demand the establishment or re-establishment of state frontiers, occasionally re-surface, 
particularly in times of war and political upheaval. Under such circumstances, Anderson 
points out, "Territorial ideologies…are more likely to be espoused by populations in a 
weak and vulnerable position," due largely to the fact that territorial ideologies appeal to 
historical identity, real or constructed, and focus on "their function of social 
protection…"56 The state thus seeks to "construct the widest territorial entity which can 
be effectively integrated into an area of political stability and economic prosperity in a 
dangerous world."57 The state, according to this view, functions as the protector of a 
historic sense of identity within the context of instability and marginalization.  
Like Anderson, Barkey argues that to understand fully the formation and 
development of the state, we must examine the nature of state-society relationships. 
According to Barkey, “The state gained power over the population through coercion but 
was then able to gain their consent as well by making them citizens entitled to certain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World, 5.  
54 Ibid, 2.  
55 Ibid, 34.  
56 Ibid, 35.  
57 Ibid, 35.  
33	  	   	  
rights from the state."58 The strength of the state stems from its cultural symbolism and 
from the "allegiance and the identification of the community as a national community."59 
Barkey uses the example Negara in nineteenth century Bali to support his thesis. The 
state, Barkey explains, performed administrative and political functions, but also 
"constituted the normative order in which society is embedded." The legitimacy of the 
state came from “its symbolized center, which focused on acting out cultural unity."60  
 Scholars that support the culture theory of state formation also argue that the state 
forms as a means of maintaining social integration. Barkey argues that the state can more 
easily form and gain legitimate authority where there is weak social integration or where 
pre-existing state structures are very weak. In Sierra Leone, for example, where "the 
British pursued a strategy of fragmenting social control at the societal level, a weak post-
colonial state ensued." Conversely, in Israel, "where the British encouraged the 
consolidation of various societal groups under the aegis of Jewish agency, the end result 
was a strong state."61 The state thus gains strength and legitimacy by appealing to a sense 
of societal unity or identity.  
 The extent to which society determines culture and identity, however, is a point of 
debate amongst scholars. Corrigan and Sayer, for example, argue:  
The power of the state 'rests not so much on the consent of its subjects but 
with the state's regulative and coercive forms and agencies, which define 
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and create certain kinds of subjects and identities while denying' others 
thorough everyday routines and rituals of ruling.62  
 
Culture theory, according to this view, rests not on physical coercion like warfare and 
conquest theory do, but on emotional and ideological coercion.  
As an advocate of culture theory, Anslo acknowledges the power of group feeling 
and shared identity, but aims to examine how “feelings” are “embodied in material 
practice and lived experience.”63 "The spatial matrix in the operation of the state system,” 
Anslo argues, “shapes the imagining of personhood as well as place."64 That is, the state 
exists not only as physical territory, but also as a determinant of personal identity. Brown, 
meanwhile, writes specifically about the role of kinship in shaping communities, arguing 
that kinship can "draw upon the past not simply to posit a common origin but also to 
claim substantial identity in the present."65 Anslo notes that feelings of kinship can also 
"sacralize" the state, or the relationship between the state and society. For example, "the 
father-son-mother relations in Mexican nationalist discourse recall the relations among 
God, Jesus, and Mary; or priests, the Church, and the religious community…"66 When the 
state becomes “sacralized,” the protection of the state not only becomes desirable, but 
obligatory, which helps to explain why so many throughout history have been willing to 
die in defense of the state.  	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According to scholars such as Adams, then, the state is more often a consequence 
of emotion rather than rational choice. Adams begins by describing the rational choice 
model of state formation, whereby state-makers consciously construct the state so as to 
advance their own material interests. After examining state formation in early modern 
Europe, however, Adams explains that the rational choice model is undermined by 
culture, which includes "culturally cognitive expectations and cognitively informed 
practices.” It also includes the actors’ "expressed feelings about ancestors and 
descendants," which often imply political privilege and group feelings of passion or 
sentiment.67 According to Adams, cultural expectations, often more so than rational 
choices, contribute to the formation of the state. 
 
GLOBAL MEDIA AND THE STATE 
Only recently have political scientists begun to explore the development of states 
in the Digital Age. With the birth of the Internet and the explosion of online information 
sharing, political scientists are becoming increasingly interested in how global media 
impacts statecraft and state development. Kraidy and Mourad are among the most 
prominent scholars in this field of study. In one particular article, Kraidy and Mourad 
analyze the implications of new global communications for the modern states, 
particularly those in the Middle East. They look specifically at the relationship between 
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“hypermedia space and political agency.”68 Kraidy and Mourad define hypermedia space 
as a "fluid communicative environment" made up of "mobile telephony, tweets, emails, 
social networks, text messaging, digital cameras, electronic newspapers, and satellite 
television…"69 This new hypermedia space, Kraidy and Mourad explain, makes 
production of and access to information easy and incredibly swift. Hypermedia space also 
allows for a much wider range of participation. Thus, "since more people are now 
theoretically able to shape a message…we can expect a multiplicity of discourses to arise 
in public culture."70  
Hypermedia space plays a particularly crucial political role in contexts of social 
and political tension. For example, Kraidy and Mourad examine Iran's "Twitter 
Revolution" following the 2009 Green Movement, and conclude that Twitter successfully 
facilitated the exchange of information across borders. As a result, Iranian activists were 
able to mobilize support outside of an exclusively Iranian context. Hypermedia space, in 
other words, blurs the boundaries between nationally based cultures and ideologies. 
Because social media is free from the restrictions (such as censorship) of physical space, 
it allows others to enter the "opinion-making game," or to participate in the development 
of politics. All of this enables the expression of an ideal counter-state. 
 According to Kraidy and Mourad, this can be problematic because it encourages 
a double-reality, one real and one virtual. Often, the physical reality cannot undergo the 	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changes needed to mimic the ideal state experienced in virtual space. Simply watching a 
Youtube video or reading a Twitter post, Kraidy and Mourad explain, does not constitute 
a political act. Unless new media translates into real, material change, "hypermedia space 
can reflect political stagnation."71 Kraidy and Mourad also ask whether hypermedia space 
is capable of influencing permanent or sustainable change. Based on their analysis of 
Lebanon's Independence Intifada and Iran's Green Movement, they conclude that, "for 
hypermedia chains to be effective, they must necessarily be integrated in pre-existing 
social networks and institutions to endow hypermedia space with trust, authenticity and 
ultimately popular acceptance."72  
Hafez similarly notes the difficulty in translating virtual reality, formed through 
social media and propaganda, into material reality. He begins by arguing that the 
inevitable connection between media and politics is not easy to define, as it depends on a 
number of socioeconomic and cultural factors. Nevertheless, Hafez acknowledges what 
he calls a “deep gulf” between public media and real political change.73 Hafez also 
explains how media is manipulated by state actors to serve the political interests of the 
state. Focusing specifically on the Arab world, he observes that Arab media often 
exhibits modern forms of "spin doctoring," or control over the way certain events are 
described to the public. For example, Hafez makes note of "beat systems," or informal 
networks between politicians and journalists whereby politicians grant loyal journalists 	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privileged information in exchange for portraying such information in a specific way.74 
This exchange relationship between media and politicians thus gives politicians influence 
over how the public interprets a certain event or news story. Media, far from being an 
objective source of news, becomes a powerful political tool of the state and a means of 
controlling public opinion.  
Global media is not reserved for the purposes of the state alone, however. 
According to Wolfsfeld, global media is a public sphere that authorities and their 
challengers are constantly fighting for control over.75 As Hafez explains, the challengers' 
ability to gain influence in the media depends on their ability to "maximize their 
individual news value through political and social status factors." Such factors may 
include, for example, extreme or exceptional behavior, such as "demonstrations, staged 
events, or even violence…"76 In other words, by engaging in exceptional or violent 
behavior, a group may increase its own relevance in, and influence over, the public media 
space.  
Anholt and Kingsepp analyze exactly how state actors or their challengers use 
global media as a political tool. Anholt in particular explores how propaganda, or “nation 
branding,” impacts the strength of the state, and vice versa. Political scientists agree that 
countries, much like companies, depend on their national image for political and 
economic success. Anholt pushes this argument further, stating:  	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We live in a world where perceptions regularly trump reality…today it's 
all about the survival of those perceived to be the fittest. Knowing how to 
deal with intangibles is just as important in such times as traditional 
military, political, or fiscal competence.77  
 
Anholt digs further into the ambiguous relationship between national image, or the 
perceived nation, and the strength of the nation in reality. He asks whether: 
A good image is merely the natural consequence of successful statecraft, 
or whether in fact it is possible to address image directly and thus in some 
ways reverse the process: an enhanced image leading to enhanced respect 
and increased business, and thus an improved reality.78  
 
Anholt admits that few studies aim to answer this question, but he nevertheless 
makes a number of observations. First, Anholt points out that propaganda campaigns in 
the modern age do not always work, since they rely on "a closed society and control over 
the sources of information reaching the target…"79 Globalization and international media, 
Anholt argues, makes strict control over the flow of information nearly impossible, 
undermining a state's ability to use media for its own political purposes. Anholt also notes 
that propaganda alone cannot easily alter one's perception of a nation-state. He explains 
that the nation's reputation is "deeply buried in the perceptions of countless people around 
the world - indeed, it is often rooted in their national cultures - and can only be rebuilt 
slowly and painstakingly by altering its causes."80 In other words, one's perception of a 
particular nation is not the product of propaganda alone, but may be linked to historical or 	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cultural factors as well. Anholt concludes that often, state media and propaganda project 
a certain state reputation that is not necessarily deserved. Anholt, like Kraidy and 
Mourad, notes a gap between perceptions, shaped by media, and material reality. 
Propaganda can nevertheless influence real political changes. This is especially 
true in times of conflict, as Kingsepp observes. Kingsepp presents two case studies, one 
focusing on the conflict between England and Spain in the 16th and 17th centuries, and 
the other focusing on the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union after 
WWII. Kingsepp notes that while military force was sometimes used in both conflicts, 
hostilities were more commonly expressed through propaganda. This is what Kingsepp 
defines as political or ideological warfare. Kingsepp concludes that in these cases, 
England and the United States used propaganda as an instrument of statecraft.  
Both England and the United States used propaganda to emphasize "the dignity of 
individual conscious" and "other aspect of human nature common to all."81 In the case of 
the Cold War conflict, for example, "by declaring solidarity with the portion of humanity 
oppressed by Communist Eastern European governments, Regan was strengthening the 
natural inclination to resist those governments, laying the foundation for movements like 
Poland's Solidarity even before the effects were visible."82 Kingsepp also points out that 
both England and the United States, in their respective conflicts, made use of counter-
propaganda by "being aware of the enemy's subtle mistakes and prepared to expose 	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them."83 Kingsepp concludes that propaganda can serve as a powerful political weapon in 
times of conflict. The spread and presentation of information can be manipulated by the 
state consolidate the support for and political power of the state.   
 
CONCLUSION  
 Obviously, there is much debate among scholars about the origin of the state and 
the process by which the state develops. For all state formation theorists, understanding 
interstate relations and the relationship between the state and society is central to 
understanding state formation. Scholars disagree, however, over whether state formation 
is primarily a consequence of internal or external affairs. Advocates of the warfare theory 
of state formation, for example, tend to view external threats as cause for the formation of 
the state, while conquest theorists view internal social divisions as the precursor to state 
formation. Scholars also disagree about what motivates state formation. Oppenheimer, 
for example, argues that material interests drive state formation while Anderson argues 
that ideology or culture more heavily influences state formation. Kraidy and Mourad, 
meanwhile, argue that global media has an important role to play in the development of 
modern states. Whether one theory alone is sufficient to describe the formation of the 
state is often another point of disagreement. Early state formation theorists, such as 
Oppenheimer or Engels, for example, tend to argue that all primitive states arose 
following the use of force. Scholars such as Spencer and Anslo, meanwhile, view state 
formation as a consequence of many factors straddling more than one theory.  	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 State formation theories vary in part due to the lack of consensus on the nature of 
the state. State functions and behavior change drastically over time and space, making it 
difficult to generalize about the way in which states form and develop. Interestingly, 
much of the literature concerning state formation revolves around the example of pre-
modern Europe. The following paper explores how state formation theories might be 
understood in the modern Middle East, and specifically in the case of the ISIS.   	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3. The Evolution and Emergence of ISIS 
1999 - July 2014 
 
 
1999-2006: ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI	  
ISIS’s seizure of Mosul on June 10, 2014 shocked the world, and left many 
wondering what ISIS is and where it came from. The origins of ISIS can be traced to Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, a militant Islamist from Jordan who, after being released from prison, 
made his way to Afghanistan to establish his own paramilitary organization. With the 
help of al-Qaeda (AQ) leaders present in Afghanistan at the time, including Osama bin 
Laden, Zarqawi established Jama’at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (JTWJ) in 1999. Having 
been taught by well-known Sunni Salafist preacher Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, Zarqawi 
was highly motivated by sectarianism and fierce opposition to the state. The initial aims 
of JTWJ, therefore, included toppling the Jordanian government and carrying out violent 
attacks on Shia Muslims. After being accused of plotting a terrorist attack in Amman, 
Jordan, Zarqawi and his new paramilitary organization were forced underground.  
But, Zarqawi and JTWJ would resurface several years later in northern Iraq. After 
the US invaded Iraq in 2003, Zarqawi saw an opportunity to establish a JTWJ base in 
Iraq. Looking to expand the organization and its operations, Zarqawi joined the 
insurgency, gaining international attention for coordinating a number of high profile 
attacks. Zarqawi is widely known, for example, to have coordinated the bombing of the 
United Nations Headquarters in Baghdad, an attack that killed 22 people, including UN 
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special envoy Sergio Viera de Mello.1 Zarqawi also claimed responsibility for attacks on 
a number of Shia holy sites, most notably the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, Iraq, which 
ended in the death of 83 worshippers.2 In February of 2004, Zarqawi helped organize yet 
another deadly attack in Iraq during the Ashura festival, an important Shia holiday. 183 
Shias were subsequently killed in Karbala and Baghdad.3 Zarqawi is perhaps most widely 
remembered for beheading two American hostages, Ken Bigley and Nick Berg, in 2004. 
Zarqawi’s use of violence and horrible brutality contributed to what would become a 
fractious relationship between Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden.4 
Zarqawi’s main targets included Iraqi Shia, which Zarqawi viewed as “the chief 
threat to Sunni power in Iraq and the wider region.” He thus hoped to “take advantage of 
the resulting chaos to cast itself as the defender of the Sunni community and to usher in 
the establishment of an Islamic state.”5 Due to the sectarian nature of his agenda, Zarqawi 
was able to gain many followers from amongst alienated Sunnis in Iraq. He was also able 
to gain support from Sunni ex-Baathists who, after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, 
were purged from seats of power. When Prime Minister Maliki assumed office, Sunnis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lawrence Joffe, "Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," The Guardian, June 8, 2006, accessed December 9, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2006/jun/09/guardianobituaries.alqaida.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Elliot, Friedland, "Special Report: The Islamic State," The Clarion Project (November 2014), accessed 
December 4, 2015, http://www.clarionproject.org/sites/default/files/islamic-state-isis-isil-factsheet-1.pdf.  
5 Charles Lister, "Profiling the Islamic State," Brookings Doha Center, December 1, 2014, accessed 
December 15, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/12/profiling-islamic-state-lister.  
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were largely shut out of politics. Thus, though Baathists are relatively secular, Zarqawi 
and many ex-Baathists shared a common anti-Shia and anti-state agenda.   
Zarqawi also made many enemies. Even within the Iraqi Sunni community, 
nationalists and Islamists alike were horrified by Zarqawi’s use of violence. Hoping to 
gain more recruits, Zarqawi formally joined al-Qaeda (AQ) in September of 2004 by 
pledging bay’ah (an oath of allegiance) to Osama bin Laden, changing the name of his 
organization to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Bin Laden had his reservations. An open letter 
from Zawahiri, bin Laden’s deputy at the time, to Zarqawi revealed a difference of 
opinion between Zarqawi and AQ leadership.6 While Zarqawi felt the only way to 
achieve his mission was through brutal force, AQ leaders warned Zarqawi against the use 
of violence, particularly against the Shia community, for fear of “damaging the image of 
the jihadi project.”7 Nevertheless, bin Laden encouraged Zarqawi to expand the AQ 
franchise in Iraq. Only two years after AQI was established, the US launched a 
counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, which came to be known simply as “the surge.” 
Subsequently, in 2006, Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike.  
 
2006-2010: ABU OMAR AL-BAGHDADI 
Soon after Zarqawi’s death, AQI joined with other AQ affiliates operating in Iraq 
at the time, forming the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) led by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. The 
change in name from al-Qaeda in Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq had symbolic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 "Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi," Global Security, accessed December 10, 2014, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm.  
7 Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State,” 8.  
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importance and marked a shift in the group’s strategy and vision. Rather than merely 
carrying out high profile attacks and inciting sectarian violence, ISI sought to establish its 
own state, one capable of generating revenue, governing territory, and implementing its 
interpretation of sharia law. Despite its name change, ISI remained an official affiliate of 
AQ. Thus, while Abu Omar al-Baghdadi governed ISI operations in Iraq, he was 
nonetheless subordinate to the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of AQ Central.8  
Following its establishment, ISI focused its efforts on Anbar province in western 
Iraq. Anbar is a tribal area of Iraq populated predominantly by marginalized Sunnis who 
felt sympathy for ISI’s anti-Shia campaign. ISI thus sought to establish a base in Anbar, 
setting up governance structures and implementing sharia law. By 2006, ISI had taken 
control of Anbar and prevented the government in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar, from 
functioning.9 After ISI fighters assassinated members of Anbar’s Provincial Council, the 
tribesmen of Anbar turned against ISI and its extreme application of sharia law. 
According to Sheikh Abdul Satter al-Rishawi, ISI insurgents were “killing innocent 
people, anyone suspected of opposing them.” “Building an alliance with the Americans,” 
Rishawi continues, “was the only solution.”10 US troops stationed in Anbar met with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ayman al-Zawahiri replaced Osama bin Laden as leader of AQ Central following bin Laden’s death in 
May of 2011. 
9 Kimberly Kagan, "Anbar Awakening: Displacing al-Qaeda from its Stronghold in Western Iraq," Institute 
for the Study of War (Washington,, D.C.), accessed December 10, 2014, 
https://www.understandingwar.org/report/anbar-awakening-displacing-al-qaeda-its-stronghold-western-
iraq.  
10 Todd Pitman, "Sunni Sheiks Join Fight Vs. Insurgency," The Associated Press, March 25, 2007, accessed 
December 10, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/03/25/AR2007032500600.html/.  
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Rishawi who agreed to help form a council of Sunni tribal militias, known as Sahwat al-
Anbar, to combat ISI. In the midst of the 2007 US-led surge, the Sahwat were 
successfully able to expel ISI from Anbar and Fallujah in a movement that came to be 
known as “the Anbar Awakening.”  
Following the US-led surge in 2007, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki grew fearful of 
the threat the newly empowered Sahwat posed to Iraq’s Shia majority. Subsequently, 
Maliki refused to incorporate the Sahwat into Iraq’s Shia-dominated government. Having 
been excluded from the political scene, many Sunni tribesmen from Anbar reverted back 
to fighting alongside ISI.11 Meanwhile, between 2006 and 2010, ISI had grown very 
weak, due largely to the US-led surge in Iraq and the global “War on Terror.”12 Many ISI 
fighters were either killed or detained, leaving ISI with very little manpower. By 2010, 
ISI was very much on its last legs, evidenced by a significant decrease in sectarian 
violence during this time.13 In 2010, Omar al-Baghdadi was killed in a joint American-
Iraqi airstrike, yet another blow to an already weakened ISI. By this point, American 
military forces had begun to withdraw from Iraq, and ISI’s newly appointed leader, Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi, saw an opportunity to revamp ISI efforts. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
11 Graeme Wood, "The Three Types of People Who Fight for ISIS," The New Republic, September 10, 
2014. Accessed September 20, 2014, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119395/isiss-three-types-
fighters.  
12 Suhaib Anjarini, "The war in Syria: ISIS's most successful investment yet," Al Akhbar English, June 11, 
2014, accessed August 31, 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/20133.  
13 Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State,” 9.  
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2010-2013: ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI 
Sources conflict on certain details pertaining to Baghdadi’s life and career. 
Though a general narrative describing Baghdadi’s background is clear, he nonetheless 
remains an enigmatic figure. According to a widely cited biography of Baghdadi released 
by jihadist websites, Baghdadi was born in 1971 in Samarra, Iraq to a religious Sunni 
family.14 His original name was Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samaarai, only 
later taking the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini al-Qurayshi. Baghdadi is said to 
have received his undergraduate and master’s degrees in Islamic studies and his PhD in 
sharia law from the University of Baghdad. Prior to Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in 
2003, Baghdadi lived in a small room attached to a mosque in Diyala, northeast of 
Baghdad, where he worked as a Sunni Salafist preacher.15 Around the time of the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, Baghdadi founded a militant Islamist group called Jaysh Ahl al-
Sunnah al-Jamaah, one of the many small militant groups that would eventually unite 
under the flag of ISI.16 In 2004, however, Baghdadi became involved in a dispute with 
the owner of the mosque at which he taught. When asked to join the political Islam Party, 
Baghdadi refused, arguing that political organizations are against Salafist teachings.17 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 "Biography of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi," SITE Intelligence Group, August 12, 2014, accessed August 19, 
2014, http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/226-the-story-behind-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi. 
15 Lamiat Sabin, "Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi profile: The mysterious leader of ISIS-and why he is called 
'invisible sheikh," The Independent, November 9, 2014, accessed November 19, 2014, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/abu-bakr-albaghdadi-profile-the-mysterious-leader-
of-isis--and-why-he-is-called-the-invisible-sheikh-9849413.html.  
16 Martin Chulov, "ISIS: the inside story," The Guardian, December 11, 2014, accessed December 14, 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story. 
17 Sabin, “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi profile.”  
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Baghdadi was thus asked to leave the mosque, and not long afterwards, US forces 
detained Baghdadi and brought him to Camp Bucca, a US military detention facility in 
southern Iraq.18  
At the time of Baghdadi’s capture, the Sunni led insurgency, in which Zarqawi 
played a major role, was consuming central and western Iraq. Most of the men being held 
in Camp Bucca were Sunni insurgents, some closely associated with Zarqawi.19 Baghdadi 
was unlike other prisoners in Bucca in one important way. Having come from the 
Quraysh tribe, the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad, Baghdadi was able to claim direct 
lineage to the Holy Prophet. According to an interview with Abu Ahmed, who spent time 
with Baghdadi in Bucca and is now a senior official within ISIS, Baghdadi was quiet, but 
had a way with words and was a skilled mediator. American prison guards saw him as 
someone who could “solve fractious disputes between competing factions and keep the 
camp quiet.”20 
At the time of Baghdadi’s arrival, Camp Bucca held about 24,000 detainees.21 
Analysts have called the camp the perfect environment for radicalization and the 
exchange of violent and extreme ideologies.22 Military veteran Andrew Thompson 
described the Iraqi military prisons as “virtual terrorist universities: The hardened 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 It is unclear exactly when and where Baghdadi was detained. Most sources indicate that Baghdadi was 
detained around Fallujah, west of Baghdad, somewhere between 2004 and 2005. 
19 Chulov, “ISIS: the inside story.” 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
22 "From Bucca to Kobani: The Hybrid Ideology of the Islamic State," The Soufan Group (New York), 
October 24, 2014, accessed October 30, 2014, http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-from-bucca-to-kobani-
the-hybrid-ideology-of-the-islamic-state/.  
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radicals were the professors, the other detainees were the students, and the prison 
authorities played the role of absent custodian.”23 According to Abu Ahmed, “Bucca was 
a factory. It made us all. It built our ideology.”24 Many militant extremists established 
alliances with former Baathist military officers who had been detained following the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein.  
These alliances formed because each had what the other needed. The Baathists 
had military experience, but little motivation, having been crushed first by US forces, 
then by Maliki’s forces. Baghdadi and his close followers, on the other hand, had 
religious fervor and inspiration, but little military or administrative experience. Thus, in 
Camp Bucca, “the math changed as ideologues adopted military and bureaucratic traits 
and the bureaucrats became violent extremists.”25 The result was an extremely powerful 
alliance motivated by a common anti-Shia agenda. In March of 2009, after the US 
ordered the closing of Camp Bucca, the detainees were released. Many at the time 
predicted that the released prisoners, now dangerously radicalized, would return to 
militant Islamist groups.26 These predictions would soon prove correct. Analysts estimate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Terrence McCoy, "How the Islamic State evolved in an American prison," The Washington Post, 
November 4, 2014, accessed December 12, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/11/04/how-an-american-prison-helped-ignite-the-islamic-state/?tid=hp_mm.  
24 Chulov, “ISIS, the inside story.” 
25 McCoy, “How the Islamic State evolved in an American prison.” 
26 Anthony Shadid, "In Iraq, Chaos Feared as U.S. Closes Prison," The Washington Post, March 22, 2009. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/21/AR2009032102255_pf.html 
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that 9 members of ISIS’s current leadership did time with Baghdadi in Camp Bucca 
between 2004 and 2009.27 
It remains unclear exactly when and how Baghdadi became involved with AQ, 
but not long after his release from Camp Bucca, Baghdadi was appointed leader of ISI. 
By 2010, US troops had begun pulling out of Iraq, and Baghdadi immediately took to 
rebuilding ISI and gaining new followers. He started by arranging an organized campaign 
of deadly car bombings and suicide attacks. ISI is known to have been capable of 
carrying out 20 to 30 attacks in difference provinces of Iraq within one hour.28 On August 
19, 2011, ISI published a statement on its website promising to carry out hundreds of 
other attacks across Iraq. According to a UN Security Council narrative summary, “the 
statement warned that the campaign would include raids, suicide attacks, roadside bombs, 
and attacks with small arms in all cities and rural areas across Iraq.”29 
ISI was truly able to rebuild itself thanks to the onset of the Syrian Civil War in 
2011. Though the conflict in Syria began as a relatively peaceful series of demonstrations 
amongst secular elements of society, the struggle quickly devolved into a violent civil 
war. Initially Baghdadi saw Syria as a distraction from ISI’s Iraq-centric campaign. 
Eventually he seized the opportunity to capitalize from the emerging chaos in Syria, 
which provided an open space in which ISI could conduct military operations and recruit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Richard Barret, "The Islamic State," The Soufan Group (New York), November 2015, accessed 
December 3, 2014, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-
Nov14.pdf.  
28 Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State,” 11.  
29 United Nations Security Council, Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) 
concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, (QI.A.299.1), June 3, 2014.   
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new fighters. By mid-2011, as the Syrian uprisings spread and became increasingly 
violent, Baghdadi planned to send several members of ISI to northern Syria to join Sunni 
rebels fighting against the Assad regime. In August of 2011, a small group of ISI fighters, 
led by Abu Mohammed al-Golani, arrived in Hasakah province in northeastern Syria. 
Zawahiri supported Baghdadi’s decision, and sent other AQ militants, mostly 
from Afghanistan and Pakistan, to fight alongside Golani. As news of ISI’s campaign in 
Syria circulated on the Internet, Golani began to attract recruits from all over Syria and 
from abroad. By 2012, Golani had an estimated 2,000 followers.30 Meanwhile, funds 
began pouring in from surrounding Sunni states, primarily the Gulf States, in support of 
Syria’s Sunni opposition. According to security analysts a large portion of those funds 
ended up being funneled to Golani and his followers.31 With no shortage of money and a 
sizable fighting force, Golani and his fighters gained large swaths of Syrian territory and 
oil fields. On January 23, 2012, the Al-Nusra Front for the People of the Levant, or 
Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), was formally established with Golani as its leader.  
During this time Baghdadi’s primary focus was centered on operations in Iraq and 
on building up ISI. In July of 2012, ISI launched a spectacular series of attacks on Iraqi 
prisons in a campaign called “Breaking the Walls.” The entire campaign lasted 12 months 
and included waves of car bombings and explosive attacks on eight major prisons.32 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Lister, “Profiling the Islamic State,” 13.  
31 “The Rise of ISIS,” Martin Smith, Frontline, aired October 28, 2014, on PBS video, accessed November 
27, 2014,  www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/rise-of-isis/.  
32 Jessica Lewis, "Al Qaeda in Iraq's 'Breaking the Walls' Campaign Achieves its Objectives at Abu 
Ghraib-2013 Iraq Update #30," Institute for the Study of War (Washington, D.C.), July 28, 2013, accessed 
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Many of the detainees being held in these prisons were former members of AQI or other 
militant Islamist groups that were suppressed during the counterinsurgency of 2006 and 
2007. The “Breaking the Walls” campaign was thus an effort to build ISI’s manpower, 
the expectation being that newly freed detainees would join the ranks of ISI. The most 
notable prison break occurred on July 21, 2013, after members of ISI attacked Abu 
Ghraib prison, located west of Baghdad. Reliable estimates suggest that as many as 500 
prisoners were freed, most of them hardened AQI veterans.33 
Seven months prior to the Abu Ghraib prison break Prime Minister Maliki sought 
yet again to undermine Iraq’s Sunni population. In December of 2012, Maliki’s police 
force arrested the bodyguards of a highly respected Sunni politician and Iraq’s Finance 
Minister Rafi al-Issawi, accusing them of plotting a terrorist attack against Maliki and his 
regime.34 Very few people, particularly those of the Sunni community, believed al-
Issawi’s bodyguards were capable of terrorism. Most perceived Maliki’s accusation as an 
attack on Sunnis and an attempt, yet again, to purge Sunnis from Iraq’s Shia-dominated 
government. Massive protests soon broke out in Ramadi and Fallujah, eventually 
expanding to other Sunni-majority cities including Mosul and Tikrit. Initially, the 
demonstrations centered on Iraq’s anti-terrorism laws, which protestors claimed were 
being used to target Sunnis. Soon demonstrators began demanding greater respect for 
civil rights and, eventually, for Maliki’s resignation. Despite their intensity, the 
demonstrations remained relatively peaceful for several months. Money poured in from 
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34 Little evidence has since been found to support the charges placed against al-Isawi’s bodyguards. 
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surrounding Sunni countries to support the protests and to help establish protest “camps” 
in which demonstrators could sleep and receive food.35 In March of 2013 several men 
attending the protests in Ramadi were seen waving the flag of AQ and calling themselves 
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).  
 
2013-2014: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISIS 
Around this time, the Syrian war had escalated drastically and JN, under the 
leadership of Golani, was gaining significant influence. Baghdadi, meanwhile, who still 
considered Golani his subordinate, saw attention shifting to Syria and away from the 
insurgency in Iraq. In April of 2013, in an effort to reassert his authority, Baghdadi 
announced the unification of ISI and JN to form the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 
(ISIS). This marked a significant shift in Baghdadi’s ambition. Rather than focusing his 
efforts solely on Iraq, Baghdadi now sought to take control of operations in Syria as well. 
He thus claimed the authority to instruct and fund operations in both Syria and Iraq.36 
When it appeared as though ISIS fighters had begun to infiltrate the protests in 
Ramadi and elsewhere, Maliki responded forcefully and violently. In April of 2013, 
regime forces cracked down on the protests in Hawijah in northern Iraq with extreme 
force, killing hundreds of demonstrators.37 ISIS members seized this as an opportunity to 
recruit Sunni protesters, arguing that greater force would be needed to oppose the regime 
successfully. This argument resonated with many marginalized and desperate Sunnis, 	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who now felt they had nowhere else to turn for protection and support. Thus, many Sunni 
protesters, despite being highly educated and relatively secular, joined ranks with ISIS.38 
Maliki, meanwhile, issued yet another crackdown on Sunni opposition. In 
December of 2013, Maliki claimed that the protest camp in Ramadi had “turned into a 
headquarters for the leadership of al-Qaeda” and subsequently ordered that security 
forces dismantle the camp. Clashes subsequently broke out, resulting in the death of 10 
Sunni civilians.39 That same month, Maliki sent the Iraqi police force to arrest Sunni 
Parliament member Ahmed al-Alwani, who had supported the protests. The Sunnis of 
Anbar, consequently, rose up in revolt and demanded that the Iraqi army leave the 
province. As chaos ensued, ISIS fighters, many coming directly from Syria, flooded into 
Anbar’s cities. Violent clashes broke out between ISIS and the Iraqi Security Forces, 
which proved to be “no match.”40 Having gained control of Anbar, ISIS began to set its 
sights on the Sunni-dominated city of Mosul in northern Iraq.  
Around this time a bitter feud had developed between Baghdadi and Golani. After 
Baghdadi announced the creation of ISIS, Golani refused to fall under Baghdadi’s 
leadership. Golani, therefore, reaffirmed his allegiance to AQ Central by appealing to 
Zawahiri. After several months of negotiations, Zawahiri ordered Baghdadi to limit his 
operations to Iraq, and appointed Golani as the leader of operations in Syria. Baghdadi 
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refused to limit his efforts to geographic boundaries, reportedly telling Zawahiri, “I chose 
the command of God over the command that runs against it in letter.”41 
 Baghdadi’s insistence on maintaining control over operations in Syria pushed 
Zawahiri to break the affiliation between ISIS and AQ. In February of 2014, Zawahiri 
announced, “ISIS is not a branch of the al-Qaeda group, we have no organizational 
relationship with it, and the group is not responsible for its actions.”42 Shortly after 
Zawahiri’s announcement, ISIS, now an independent organization, significantly 
increased its operations in Syria, gaining control of territory and numerous oil fields in 
eastern Syria. For a brief period of time, the split between ISIS and JN remained 
somewhat unclear to fighters on the ground and, subsequently, many JN fighters defected 
to ISIS in early 2014. According to some estimates, nearly 65 percent of JN fighters, 
mostly non-Syrians, defected to ISIS.43 The dispute between JN and ISIS would, 
nevertheless, intensify over time and devolve into an all-out jihadi “civil war.”44 
While some have described the rivalry between Baghdadi and Golani as little 
more than a power struggle, there are in fact important ideological differences between 
the two leaders that help to explain the hostile relationship between ISIS and JN. ISIS 	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members, for one, are uninterested in remaining underground and surfacing only to 
terrorize or commit violent attacks. They have a plan to establish a state and to overrun 
any person or group in opposition. Unlike AQ, ISIS is a state-building enterprise, one that 
aims to create a real, high-functioning state. Golani, like Baghdadi, also seeks to establish 
a state, but he does not believe the time has come to restore the Islamic Caliphate. The 
state that Golani envisions, therefore, is limited mainly to Syria. Golani has also chosen 
to postpone answering questions regarding state building and governance until after 
Assad’s overthrow.45 Baghdadi, on the other hand, seeks to establish a global caliphate 
that not only includes Iraq and Syria, but also encompasses the entire Arab world.46 
Unlike Golani and Zawahiri, Baghdadi believes that the Islamic Caliphate must be 
restored now rather than later, and that a single emir must rule as the state’s central 
authority.  
After increasing its territorial control and manpower in Syria, and having 
solidified its control over parts of western Iraq, ISIS saw an opportunity to attack Mosul. 
On June 6, 2014, ISIS detonated several car bombs in downtown Mosul. Four days later, 
800 ISIS fighters,47 with the help of an “uneasy alliance” with former Baathists, Sunni 
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tribesmen, and other Sunni rebels,48 captured control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. 
The capture of Mosul gave ISIS fighters a tremendous boost of confidence and left them 
with a supply of Russian and American-made military equipment. ISIS fighters then 
made their way quickly south, capturing the cities of Qayyarah, al-Shiqat, Hawijah, and 
Tikrit.  
Then, on June 29th, the first day of Ramadan, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, the 
official spokesman of ISIS, announced the restoration of the Caliphate and cited 
Baghdadi as caliph.49 That same day, ISIS ’s media center released a video titled “The 
End of Sykes Picot,” which shows an ISIS fighter pointing to a bulldozed Syria-Iraq 
border saying, “This is the so called border of Sykes-Picot…we don’t recognize it and we 
will never recognize it.”50 Nine Syrian rebel groups, including JN, immediately rejected 
the establishment of the caliphate, and warned other jihadist organizations not to support 
the Islamic State.51 Nevertheless, on July 4th, Baghdadi delivered a sermon in Mosul in 
which he reminded Muslims of their “obligation” to support the Islamic State and to 
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“spread the truth.”52 Baghdadi’s sermon gained international attention as thousands of 
fighters from around the world flocked to Syria and Iraq to support Baghdadi.53 
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4. The Islamic Caliphate: 
An Appeal to History 
 
 
In order to gauge the magnitude of Baghdadi’s establishment of the Islamic State, 
it is important to understand the significance of the Caliphate in Islamic tradition. Despite 
the many different schisms that exist in Islam, most Muslim scholars agree on the 
necessary unity of the Muslim community.1 According to the 14th century Islamic scholar 
Ibn Khaldun, the best type of political community is a caliphate defined by the authority 
of Islamic law and the social unity of all Muslims.2 Given the many political and social 
divisions that exist in the Muslim community today, the concept of unity is a powerful 
and appealing image to many.  
Many perceive the Caliphate to be an archaic and naturally barbaric institution 
rooted solely in the seventh century. But, the nature of the Caliphate and the application 
of Islamic law have actually proven flexible and open to many interpretations and 
degrees of adaptability. Baghdadi appears to reject such flexibility. As a traditional Salafi 
Muslim, Baghdadi rejects bid’ah, or religious innovation that emerged after the time of 
the Prophet Muhammad and the early caliphs. ISIS is thus modeled after a Sunni 
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understanding of the Caliphate ruled initially by the Rashidun, or the first four caliphs of 
the Muslim Empire. ISIS is thereby reverting to a seventh century style of governance. 
 
THE CALIPHATE AND ITS CALIPHS  
What was the purpose and nature of the seventh century Caliphate? Answering 
this question is critical to understanding ISIS’s current style of governance. From the 
beginning, the Islamic Caliphate has been more than just a political entity in the way that 
we often think about modern states. In the Quran, the primary obligation of the khalifa, or 
Caliphate, is to implement sharia, or Islamic law, in order to promote virtue and prevent 
vice. The Caliphate is thus a legal and spiritual institution that dictates both the political 
and moral lives of its subjects. Contrary to popular belief, the original Islamic Caliphate 
was not tied to the Arab identity. Rather, “the Islamic caliphate was a polity that 
developed into a multi-ethnic transnational empire in which the bond of faith and the rule 
of shari’a constituted the basis for centralized government.”3 
The Caliphate could thus be described as an institution that transcends ethnic, 
linguistic, and tribal identities. On July 1st, Baghdadi released an audio message to his 
fellow Muslims justifying the restoration of the Caliphate. He appealed to the 
transnational nature of the Caliphate, describing the Islamic State as: 
 a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black man, the 
easterner and westerner are all brothers…Syria is not for Syrians, and Iraq 
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is not for Iraqis. The east is Allah’s…The State is a state for all Muslims. 
The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims.4  
 
The Caliphate thus includes the entire Muslim world, which can be divided into smaller 
provinces called wilayat. Each province is governed by a local ruler who has pledged his 
allegiance to the caliph, or central leader of the Caliphate.  
The title of caliph holds great historical significance. The world “caliph” comes 
from the Arabic khalifat Allah, meaning “deputy of God.” After the Prophet Muhammad 
died in 632 AD, the Muslim community was suddenly left without a leader. Who would 
succeed the Prophet and what his role would be was, for a short time, highly uncertain. It 
was assumed that only those closest to the Prophet were suitable to serve as leaders of the 
Muslim community. The Prophet’s close friend, Abu Bakr as-Saddiq, became the Muslim 
world’s first caliph in June of 632, followed by Umar ibn al-Khattab, Uthman ibn Affan, 
and finally by Muhammad’s cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib. These first four caliphs came to be 
known as the Rashidun, or Rightly Guided Caliphs, due to their personal connection to 
the Prophet Muhammad. Though other caliphs followed the Rashidun, such as the 
Umayyads, the Abbasids, and the Ottomans, the Rashidun were considered the only 
“virtuous and pure” rulers.5 Many notable Islamic scholars have emphasized this idea, 
such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldun, who argue that only the Rashidun Caliphate 
was truly Islamic in nature. Caliphates following that of the Rightly Guided Caliphs were 
marked by greed and corruption and evolved into kingships.6 The time of the Prophet 	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Muhammad and the Rightly Guided Caliphs is thus widely considered a “normative” 
period to be emulated.7 
Historically, the main responsibility of the caliph was to “maintain the hudud 
(crimes and punishments delineated by the Quran), uphold rights, and re-establish good 
practices instituted by righteous men.”8 The caliph was thus not only the head of the 
Muslim community, but provided the means of attaining salvation. He was the “protector 
and defender of the faith” and was responsible for enforcing God’s law and spreading it 
through geographic expansion.9 The caliph also had civic responsibilities and complete 
control over the political, judicial, military, and fiscal affairs of the community. Thus, 
historically, the caliph was both a political and religious leader. The necessary marriage 
of politics and religion is something that ISIS has consistently emphasized in its 
propaganda campaign meant to bolster support for Baghdadi, also known amongst ISIS 
supporters as “Caliph Ibrahim.” For example, an article in ISIS’s online magazine Dabiq 
reads:  
The people today have failed to understand that imamah [leader of the Muslim 
community] in religious affairs cannot be properly established unless the people 
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of truth first achieve comprehensive political imamah over the lands and the 
people.10  
 
How does one become caliph? Even today, there is very little consensus regarding the 
selection of caliph.11 Traditionally caliphs are to have some sort of connection to the 
Prophet Muhammad. After the Rightly Guided Caliphs, all of whom were the Prophet’s 
personal companions, it became traditional to select the caliph from the Quraysh tribe, 
which is the tribe of Muhammad. By selecting caliphs from the Quraysh tribe, many 
reason, caliphs will forever maintain a sense of kinship or closeness to the Prophet. 
Baghdadi is widely believed to be a member of the Quraysh tribe, which greatly 
strengthens his legitimacy. Once selected, traditionally by an Islamic council, the caliph’s 
position would be solidified by the councilmen’s oaths of allegiance, otherwise known as 
pledges of bay’ah.12 The early caliphs are known to have lived simple, religious 
lifestyles, much like the Prophet himself. They were also expected to be “pious, upright, 
competent, able bodied, and well versed in the law.”13 According to Dabiq, Baghdadi is 
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qualified to be caliph not only because of his “noble lineage,” but also because of his 
“sound intellect and a prestigious level of knowledge and religious practice.”14  
Though the Rashidun were close companions of the Prophet, and therefore the 
best examples of how the Prophet lived, they were not prophets themselves. This would 
suggest that even the Rightly Guided Caliphs, though considered the “deputies” of God 
on earth, were subject to fault and imperfection. Much like the Rightly Guided Caliphs, 
Baghdadi has acknowledged his own fallibility. In his July 4st Mosul sermon, Baghdadi 
announced, “I’ve been tested by Allah in my election as caliph. It’s a heavy burden. I’m 
no better than you. Advise me when I err and follow me if I succeed. And assist me 
against the tawagheet” [plural of taghut, meaning rebel or idolater].15 Devout Muslims 
would have recognized this part of Baghdadi’s speech as a reference to Caliph Abu Bakr 
as-Saddiq’s inaugural speech. Shortly after the Prophet Muhammad died, the Muslims of 
Medina gathered inside the Prophet’s mosque to pay allegiance to Aby Bakr as-Saddiq, 
the first caliph of the of the Muslim community. Abu Bakr as-Saddiq addressed those 
before him by saying, “Now it is beyond doubt the I have been elected your Amir, 
although I am not better than you. Help me, if I am right; set me right if I am wrong.”16 
This subtle parallel between Abu Bakr as-Siddiq’s inaugural speech and Baghdadi’s 
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sermon in Mosul strengthens Baghdadi’s credibility and his image as a “humble servant 
of righteousness.”17 
The early caliphal period is not only remembered for its righteous leaders, but 
also for the dramatic military expansion of the Muslim Empire. Between 632 and 661, 
under the leadership of the Rashidun, Muslim armies conquered all of the Middle East, 
North Africa, and the Sasanian Empire of Persia, which stretched from the Mediterranean 
to the Indus Valley of modern-day Pakistan and northern India. The early Caliphate also 
encompassed the Byzantine Empire’s hold on Sicily, the lands between Syria and Egypt, 
and much of the Iberian Peninsula.18 These military victories were significant because 
they symbolized the “historical validation of the message of Islam.”19 The successful 
expansion of the newly established Muslim Empire was, in the eyes of many, evidence 
that God favored the Muslim community. The idea that military victory is evidence of 
God’s favor is prominent in ISIS rhetoric and propaganda. In his July 4th Mosul sermon, 
for example, Baghdadi said: 
And you brothers the mujahideen, indeed did Allah, blessed and exalted, 
give them victories and conquests which came after many years of 
hardship and patience. And they were firm against the enemies of Allah, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Tom Rogan,"Three observations on the Isis leader's video," The Telegraph, July 7, 2014, accessed 
December 16, 2014, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/tomrogan/100278930/three-observations-on-the-isis-
leaders-video/.  
18 Edward N. Luttwak, "Caliphate Redivivus? Why a Careful Look at the 7th Century Can Predict How the 
Caliphate Will End," Joscelyn Institution, no. 17 (2014), accessed December 16, 2014, 
http://www.hoover.org/research/caliphate-redivivus-why-careful-look-7th-century-can-predict-how-new-
caliphate-will-end.  
19 Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 43.  
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and He made them powerful in the land until the declaration of the 
Caliphate and choice of an imam.20  
 
This type of rhetoric resonates with those who believe that the success of the 
contemporary Caliphate is confirmation of God’s intervention on behalf of the Muslim 
community.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. On June 16, 2014 (3:52 p.m.), Twitter user “@Third_Position” posted a “roadmap” depicting 
ISIS’s plan for military conquest. 
 
To this day, Muslim scholars continue to debate whether the Caliphate is a 
religious obligation. Thirteenth century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, for example, 
discounts the Caliphate as being required by the Quran, arguing that the Caliphate “came 
into being after Muhammad’s death in 632.”21 Thus, the Caliphate and imamate are 
“simply political traditions, which Ibn Taymiyyah accepts in the name of social order, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Justpaste.it, "Translation of the Khutbah of Commander of the Faithful.” 
21 Youssef H. Enein, Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 
Institute Press, 2010), 110. 
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are not divinely ordained.”22 The Caliphate, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, is not a Quranic 
requirement, but a reaction to the death of Muhammad and a “temporal institution to 
govern Muslims.”23 Ibn Taymiyyah nevertheless considers political rule necessary to 
improve the religious conditions of society. Thus, many use political and religious 
connections to argue that the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate is in fact a religious 
obligation.  
Since the seventh century, “the objective of the [Islamic] state was to spread the 
hegemony of this new religion, Islam…to establish a public order that was dedicated to 
the recognition of God’s oneness and to the observance of what Muslims considered a 
proper attitude of piety and mindfulness of God.” Thus, the expansion of the Islamic 
State was considered “a legitimate-indeed an obligatory-endeavor.”24 Today, the 
Caliphate is widely considered a means of protecting the glory days of Islam from 
modern injustices. Thus, in his July 4th Mosul sermon, Baghdadi asserts, “And this 
[establishment of a caliphate] is a matter obligatory upon all Muslims. It is waajib 
[highest level of obligation]…the religion cannot be in place unless sharia is 
established.”25 By seeking to establish a caliphate rather than a state, ISIS is appealing to 
the traditionalists who feel they have a religious obligation to support the Islamic State 
and pledge loyalty to its caliph.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid.  
23 Mustafa Akyol, Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 
2011), 251.   
24 Fred McGraw Donner, "Introduction," in The Articulation of Early Islamic State Structures (Farnham, 
Surrey: Ashgate Variorum, 2012), 17.  
25 Justpaste.it, "Translation of the Khutbah of Commander of the Faithful.” 
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CONTEMPORARY DEBATES AND PERCEPTIONS 
ISIS’s expressed desire to restore the Sunni Caliphate is not new or unique to 
ISIS. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, Islamists and politicians around the 
world have consistently spoken about the potential restoration of the Caliphate. Although 
the Caliphate is often associated with religious extremism, the idea of an Islamic state is 
more often an honest attempt to fit Islam into the political lives of Muslims. Reviving the 
Caliphate, in other words, is often presented as a solution to modern political crises in the 
Muslim world. Consensus regarding the actual restoration of the Caliphate is fragmented. 
Until ISIS gained power, the Caliphate was merely an ideal, one “limited to the 
boundaries of the imagination.”26 The Caliphate is nevertheless an appeal to a golden age 
of Islam that many Muslims, both religious and secular, identify with and feel deep 
nostalgia for. It is also a reminder of “the gap between what Muslims once were and 
where they now find themselves.”27 This gap ultimately stands at the center of “the anger 
and humiliation that drive political violence in the Middle East.”28  
According to a 2007 survey conducted by the US Department of Homeland 
Security, 65% of Muslims across Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia, and Pakistan supported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 McQuaid, "Reviving the Caliphate: Fad, or the Future?" 7.  
27 Shadi Hamid, "The Roots of the Islamic State's Appeal," The Atlantic, October 31, 2014, accessed 
December 14, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/the-roots-of-the-islamic-
states-appeal/382175/.  
28 Ibid.  
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“unifying all Islamic countries into a single state or Caliphate.”29 The same survey 
revealed that 71% of Muslims agreed with requiring “strict application of sharia law in 
every Islamic country.” At the same time, 67% supported democratic systems of 
governance, which makes one wonder how the vast majority of Muslims interpret sharia 
law and the Caliphate. Nevertheless, the Caliphate is a mobilizing idea, as it tends to 
combine “religious discourse with political aspirations, creating in the process powerful 
emotional and moral commitments as well as legal responsibilities.”30  
Mention of the Caliphate has thus been present in the rhetoric and ideologies of 
various Islamic organizations over the last century. Various political groups, such as the 
international pan-Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir, have frequently called for the restoration 
of the Caliphate. Such groups have never posed a legitimate threat to existing state 
borders because they are mostly “deterritorialized,” meaning they have little connection 
to any one geographic location.31 AQ has similarly advocated for the restoration of the 
Caliphate, though this has not driven the group’s agenda. The concept of the Caliphate is 
used by AQ primarily as a rhetorical and tactical tool, enabling AQ to “tie the agenda of 
disparate local and regional jihadis to its own banner as the leader of global jihad.”32 
 Based on AQ’s actions over the years, its members are more concerned with 
combatting the West than with establishing an Islamic state. In fact, most AQ leaders 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 WorldPublicOpinion.org, "Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and Al-Qaeda," 
Washington: The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2007, accessed December 8, 
2014, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf.  
30 Al-Rasheed and Shterin, Demystifying the Caliphate, 2.  
31 McQuaid, "Reviving the Caliphate: Fad, or the Future?" 9.  
32 Ibid. 
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believe that the actual establishment of an Islamic state must be left to God. For example, 
whenever Maqdisi, the spiritual leader of AQI, was asked about the Islamic state, he 
simply responded by saying that the rule of idols (Hakm al-taghut) must be replaced by 
the rule of God (Hakm Allah).33 Rather than restoring the Caliphate, “the goals they [AQ] 
have specified repeatedly are the liberation of occupied land, the eradication of 
corruption and dictatorial rule imposed from abroad, and political independence free from 
outside interference.”34 ISIS’s primary aim to establish a real and legitimate caliphate 
thus sets it apart from other jihadist organizations that have a merely conceptual 
understanding of the Caliphate. For ISIS leaders, the Caliphate is not just a mobilizing 
idea, but is an actual institution that ought to be built and sustained.  
It is no wonder that ISIS has established such a large following in recent months. 
Unlike other jihadist organizations, which only talk about establishing a caliphate, ISIS 
has not only formally announced the restoration of the Caliphate, but has successfully 
established control over about as much territory as Abu Bakr as-Saddiq had during his 
reign as caliph in the seventh century.35 ISIS is not merely looking to control territory, 
but also to establish a legal system modeled after that of the seventh century Caliphate. 
Baghdadi’s “dhimmi pact” serves as one example of this. In some of the earliest days of 
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Islam, the caliph was responsible for imposing dhimmi status. A dhimmi was a non-
Muslim citizen of the Islamic state, usually a Christian or a Jew. 
 In exchange for paying jizya (a poll tax reserved for second-class citizens), and 
by agreeing to live under the rules of the Islamic state, non-Muslims would be granted 
some legal protections. This arrangement is not only considered traditional of the first 
Islamic state, but is also mandated by the Quranic verse 9:29.36 Thus, unsurprisingly, 
Baghdadi issued a document imposing dhimmi status on Christians in Raqqa of northern 
Syria in February of 2014. The document bears Baghdadi’s signature as amir al-
mu’mineen, which means “Commander of the Faithful.” This is a title traditionally 
reserved for caliphs, so even before Baghdadi’s June declaration of the Caliphate, 
Baghdadi was already projecting himself as leader of the world’s Muslims.37  
From the perspective of many traditionalist Muslims, Baghdadi’s July 4th Mosul 
sermon only confirmed his legitimacy as a caliph comparable to the Rashidun. Baghdadi 
entered the Great Mosque wearing a black robe and turban, which is what the Prophet is 
believed to have worn when he conquered Mecca. The black turban has since come to 
symbolize one’s lineage to the Prophet.38 Baghdadi then climbed the pulpit slowly and 
calmly before facing his audience. It is often said that the Prophet and the Rashidun acted 	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with a similar sense of composure and serenity.39 Before delivering his sermon, Baghdadi 
cleaned his mouth with a miswak, or a small piece of wood that the Prophet is known to 
have used to clean his teeth. Finally, Baghdadi began his sermon, speaking in perfect 
classical Arabic, which is not only the form of Arabic used by the early caliphs, but is 
also considered the language of Islam and of religious scholarship. All of these small 
details, while largely overlooked by western media, greatly bolstered Baghdadi’s image 
as a legitimate caliph in the eyes of many traditionalists.  	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5. From Forums to Twitter:  
How ISIS Spreads Its Message 
 
There is a certain irony in the way that ISIS operates. ISIS is a fundamentalist 
organization that seeks to establish a seventh century style of Islamic statehood, yet it is 
remarkably modern in its use of pop-cultural technology. ISIS, like other jihadist 
organizations before it, has found the Internet to be one of its greatest weapons. Since the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, radical jihadist groups have used the Internet as a way of 
spreading their message and communicating with fellow jihadists and sympathizers. 
Throughout the early part of the 21st century, jihadi websites, blogs, and web forums (or 
message boards) were the primary means of media dissemination.1 AQ and AQ-affiliated 
organizations in particular are well-established users of web forums, as web forums allow 
for a certain degree of anonymity and provide a space for multimedia and interactivity 
amongst many users.  
Jihadi media on the Internet range from news stories to training manuals to high-
quality propaganda, often linking to external sites such as Youtube or archive.org. Unlike 
blogs or websites, media content on web forums is not published by the site itself, but is 
contained within the users' posts.2 This makes the spread of information swift and 
widespread. Users are often required to obtain special permission to post on forums. 
Thus, jihadi forums usually contain content that is strictly favorable or sympathetic 	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2 Ibid, 393. 
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towards the associated organization. Researchers have also noted a certain "hierarchy" 
within jihadi forums as well, whereby some users are more active than others, and certain 
sub-forums are only accessible to senior members.3 Due to the nature of forums, 
therefore, AQ's media campaign is known to be fairly controlled and centralized.  
ISIS’s media campaign differs from its predecessors. Unlike AQ, ISIS does not 
use forums as a primary means of spreading information, marking a significant break in 
radical jihadi tradition. While ISIS sympathizers are active on web forums, such as 
Platform Media, most ISIS media is disseminated through more conventional social 
media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube. Twitter in particular has 
become one of ISIS's most effective propaganda tools. According to the researchers at 
Jihadica, Twitter emerged as a prominent platform for radical jihadists between 2010 and 
2012, following the outbreak of violence in Syria.4 In 2011, members of jihadi forums 
began posting advisories and training manuals advertising the importance of Twitter. 
These posts were quickly copy-and-pasted to "al-Shamukh," a well-known web forum 
dominated by AQ members and sympathizers.5 
While other Islamist groups, including AQ, maintain Twitter accounts, ISIS is by 
far the most active social media user.6 For a short time, most of ISIS’s official media 
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5 At this time, ISIS was still affiliated with AQ central. 
6 Anti-Defamation League, “Hashtag Terror: How ISIS Manipulates Social Media,” Anti-Defamation 
League, August 21, 2014, accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.adl.org/combating-hate/international-
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centers had their own associated Twitter accounts controlled by ISIS leadership.7 Al-
I’tisam, for example, had more than 50,000 Twitter followers before its account was 
suspended in June of 2014.8 The Twitter account associated with the ISIS media 
company, Ajnad, had about 36,500 followers and tweeted mostly religious citations.9 
Another one of ISIS’s official media wings, al-Furqan, had a number of associated 
Twitter pages that circulated the office’s multimedia, including written posts and reports, 
images, and videos. Al-Hayat, an ISIS media center that focuses on recruiting westerners, 
maintained several Twitter accounts that distributed ISIS’s English-language publications 
such as Dabiq. By late 2014 and early 2015, however, these “official” accounts had 
mostly been suspended by Twitter. According to Cole Bunzel, an expert in jihadi media 
and a researcher for Jihadica, each ISIS province also had an official Twitter handle 
associated with its media office, but these accounts were also shut down in recent 
months.10 Consequently, ISIS has had to resort to unofficial Twitter accounts and 
networks of users to spread information. The result is a highly decentralized, though 
well-coordinated, media campaign.  
The decentralized nature of ISIS media distribution, which involves hundreds of 
social media users located all over the world, makes ISIS’s strategy unique. According to 
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analysts at The Brookings Institution, there were at least 45,000 Twitter accounts being 
used by ISIS supporters in the fall of 2014.11 Saudi-born Abu Amr al Shami reportedly 
oversees ISIS’s overall media effort.12 Al Shami is responsible for controlling a large 
army of bloggers and social media enthusiasts whose job is be to constantly online and 
disseminate ISIS media material. Social media poses a certain challenge for ISIS, as 
platforms such as Twitter make the rapid spread of misinformation easy and highly 
likely. Thus, according to the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, ISIS 
imposed strict media regulations in eastern Syria, demanding that all videos, photographs, 
and written reports be reviewed by ISIS’s “Information Office” prior to distribution.13  
Once approved, messages and links to publications are sent out by ISIS’s media centers 
and affiliated Twitter accounts, which are re-tweeted by thousands of other ISIS 
supporters active on social media. Within hours, a single social media post will have 
reached millions of people all over the world. This method of media dissemination is 
highly strategic. ISIS appears to be sacrificing strict control over the delivery of its 
message in exchange for widespread circulation and rapid distribution.  
The decentralized nature of ISIS’s media campaign also makes it hard to shut 
down. While web forums, such as those used by AQ, require a lot of work to maintain 	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and are relatively easy to block from the Internet, the same cannot be said for more public 
social media platforms. Though social media companies, such as Twitter and Youtube, 
frequently suspend accounts they recognize as being linked to ISIS, suspended users can 
immediately create new accounts simply by changing their Twitter handles or usernames. 
These new accounts are then advertised by other pro-ISIS accounts. Thus, the suspension 
of Twitter accounts might make ISIS's outreach more difficult, but it does not quash the 
effort altogether. Social media companies have also found it difficult to identify those 
accounts that are worth shutting down in the first place. It is nearly impossible, for 
example, to discern those accounts managed by mere ISIS sympathizers or reckless 
teenagers from those managed by ISIS militants spread across Iraq and Syria. 
Consequently, it has become nearly impossible to control the speed and ease with which 
ISIS spreads its message. 
Though there are thousands of Twitter accounts supporting ISIS, some are more 
authentic that others, indicated by the number of followers an account has or how often 
the user posts.14 One pro-ISIS Twitter account, for example, which can be identified by 
the handle @mohamed_khames, has over twenty thousand followers and contains 
between 50 and 100 new posts every day, making it appear as if the user is posting in real 
time. As with other pro-ISIS accounts, these posts include official and unofficial photos 
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and videos15 depicting ISIS activity in a number of different provinces under ISIS 
control. Some accounts release timely military updates by posting photos and videos of 
battles soon after they occur. Other accounts post Quranic citations, photos of life under 
ISIS rule, or mere expressions of praise for Baghdadi and the Islamic State. Most posts, 
however, are re-tweets, or tweets picked up from other accounts and re-posted.  
ISIS also uses Twitter to infiltrate unrelated social movements and activist groups 
present online by using the same hashtags and similar rhetoric.16 Through what is known 
as "hashtag hijacking," ISIS is virtually able to align other non-jihadi movements 
occurring around the world with its own militant struggle. After the race riots in 
Ferguson, Missouri in November of 2014, ISIS Twitter users started using the hashtags 
"#FergusonUnderISIS" and "From #IS to Ferguson" to display support for the Ferguson 
protestors and to portray the American government as violent and oppressive.17 For 
example, one Twitter user, identified by the handle @abudujana56, posted on November 
25th, "For how long will you let these govts[sic] oppress u[sic]. Draw ur[sic] knives and 
show them a response!!"  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 By "official" photos and videos, I am referring to media released by one of ISIS's formal media centers. 
These publications can be identified by the existence of an ISIS’s media logo usually found in the corner of 
the publication.  
16 Prucha, "Jihadi Twitter Activism." 
17 John Hall, "ISIS supports Ferguson protestors: Islamic militants pledge to send over 'soldiers that don't 
sleep, whose drink is blood, and their play is carnage,'" Daily Mail, November 26, 2014, accessed February 
24, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2850442/We-hear-help-ISIS-tweets-support-Ferguson-
protesters-reject-corrupt-man-laws-like-democracy.html. 
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Figure 3. Twitter post by user Abu Dajana (@abudujana56) on  
November 25, 2014 at 9:26 p.m. 
 
 
 
Pro-ISIS Twitter users frequently mentioned the names of black civil rights leaders in 
their posts as well, thus aligning ISIS's cause with the Civil Rights Movement.18 This is 
only one of many instances in which ISIS supporters have used Twitter to infiltrate 
unrelated conversations in hopes of gaining sympathy and new recruits.  
By analyzing the most active Twitter accounts and the connections between those 
accounts19 researchers have been able to map information sharing networks or virtual 
"ecosystems" in which ISIS Twitter users interact.20 Research concerning networks dates 
back to the 18th century, when Leonhard Euler developed a new form of mathematics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Hall, "ISIS supports Ferguson protestors." 
19 We can confirm a "connection" between two accounts if the two accounts frequently share information 
by re-tweeting, or if two users simply mention the username of the other in his or her post.  
20 Nico Purcha, "Jihadi Twitter Activism part 2: Jabhat al-Nusra on the Twittersphere," Jihadica, May 13, 
2013, accessed February 24, 2015, http://www.jihadica.com/jihadi-twitter-activism-part-2-jabhat-al-nusra-
on-the-twittersphere/. 
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called graph theory. Graph theory can be used to analyze relationships between objects or 
people, referred to by scientists as “nodes.” Interest in graph theory increased in the latter 
half of the 20th century, and by the 1990s, the study of networks had developed into a 
full-fledged field of science.21 Early researchers in this new field of science found that 
clusters of people naturally organized themselves into networks. Networks expanded as 
two unrelated people met through a common friend, and as networks got bigger, 
"communication among the people in the network got much more efficient."22  
This type of network analysis is being used more and more by intelligence 
communities, and has proven very useful in analyzing terrorist networks. By analyzing 
the communication records of suspected terrorists, intelligence officials have been able to 
map well-organized networks of information flow. This is precisely what makes Twitter 
such a powerful tool in understanding how ISIS spreads its message. ISIS Twitter 
accounts form networks that allow users to coordinate their tweets and post similar links 
or hashtags within a particular time frame. As a result, these accounts end up at the top of 
Twitter search results, further amplifying the users' message. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Digital Tonto, "How the NSA Uses Social Network Analysis to Map Terrorist Networks," Digital Tonto, 
June 12, 2013, accessed March 9, 2015, http://www.digitaltonto.com/2013/how-the-nsa-uses-social-
network-analysis-to-map-terrorist-networks/. 
22 Ibid. 
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Figure 4. This network graph, produced by the Brookings Institution, shows interactions between 
pro-ISIS Twitter users in the month of February 2015. The darkly shaded areas of the graph suggest 
a high level of interaction between the most connected users of the Twitter network; the lightly shaded 
areas suggest a lower level of interaction among peripheral members of the network.23 
 
 
Some Twitter users are more active than others and certain accounts considered more 
reliable depending on how far removed the user is from ISIS central. Thus, we can see 
virtual hierarchies developing within ISIS Twitter networks, similar to the user hierarchy 
researchers have observed on jihadi web forums.  
Twitter networks pose a challenge for governments working to combat ISIS 
messages and prevent online recruitment. In 2011, the Obama Administration established 
the United States Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, which aims to 
provide counter messages on social media and deter potential ISIS sympathizers from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 J.M. Berger and Jonathan Morgan, "The ISIS Twitter Census," The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations 
with the Islamic World, no. 20 (March, 2015): 57, accessed March 2, 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-
morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf.  
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joining the ranks of AQ or ISIS.24 In what has become known as the "Think again, Turn 
away" campaign, the Center harnesses and amplifies counter messaging by large federal 
intelligence agencies, such as the Pentagon and Department of Homeland Security, as 
well as messaging by nongovernment agencies, academics, and Muslim leaders.25 The 
Center also employs foreign language specialists who post in a number of languages 
including Arabic, Urdu, and Punjabi.  
Despite its sophistication, however, the Center remains fairly small and is unable 
to match the outstanding volume of pro-ISIS messages that are posted to the Internet each 
day. It is also important to note that those who are sympathetic towards ISIS's cause and 
vulnerable to its propaganda usually share feelings of hostility towards the US 
government. Thus, the mere fact that the Center is affiliated with the US government is in 
itself detrimental to the Center's mission. The biggest challenge to the Center's counter 
messaging effort, however, is the nature of ISIS's Twitter campaign. As previously 
explained, pro-ISIS Twitter accounts are organized into cyber clusters or networks. As of 
yet, counter messages have not sufficiently penetrated these networks and remain fairly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Hayes Brown, "Meet the State Department Team Trying to Troll ISIS Into Oblivion," Think Progress, 
September 18, 2014, accessed February 12, 2015. 
http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/09/18/3568366/think-again-turn-away/. 
25 Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS' Message," February 16, 2014, accessed February 22, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/world/middleeast/us-intensifies-effort-to-blunt-isis-
message.html?_r=0. 
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isolated. Tweets coming from the Center thus constitute "less a counter message and 
more a separate conversation."26 
Efforts to blunt ISIS’s message became infinitely more difficult in April of 2014 
when ISIS launched an app called “The Dawn of Glad Tidings,” or simply, “The Dawn.” 
Between April and June of 2014, an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 people downloaded the 
app, which allows users to follow ISIS's progress and receive news updates.27 Once 
downloaded, the app automatically posts to one’s personal Twitter account, and to the 
accounts of everyone else who has signed up for the app. As a result, a single tweet, often 
a link, photo, or hashtag, gets posted and circulated in incredible volume. For example, 
according to The Atlantic, approximately 40,000 tweets were sent out through the app on 
the day ISIS captured Mosul.28 This app has not only allowed ISIS propaganda to reach a 
large audience with the single click of a button, but it has also made it more difficult for 
Twitter to identify accounts worth suspending.  
Social media platforms are not ISIS’s sole means of communication, however. 
Websites such as Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube are highly public, so when seeking a 
more private means of spreading information, ISIS-affiliated users often use phone apps 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Nico Prucha, "Turning the volume up to 11 is not enough: Why counter-strategies have to target 
extremist clusters," Jihadica, February 9, 2015, accessed February 12, 2015,  
http://www.jihadica.com/turning-the-volume-up-to-11-is-not-enough-why-counter-strategies-have-to-
target-extremist-clusters/. 
27 Andrew Brauni, “The Islamic State online: ISIL’s many accounts,” IDG Connect, January 15, 2015, 
accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.idgconnect.com/abstract/9341/the-islamic-state-online-isil-
accounts. 
28 J.M. Berger, “How ISIS Games Twitter,” The Atlantic, June 16, 2014, accessed February 1, 2015, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/. 
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such as Whatsapp or Kik. Whatsapp and Kik are mobile messengers that operate much 
like texting plans, allowing users to send messages, pictures, and videos to other users or 
groups. Unlike text messages, however, Whatsapp and Kik messages are sent over 
Internet connection and are therefore free of domestic and international charge. Kik is a 
particularly important media tool for ISIS supporters.29 Unlike Whatsapp, Kik does not 
require users' phone numbers, but rather allows users to create usernames as their only 
identifier. When sending out messages, users are not limited to the phone numbers on 
their contact lists, but can connect with anyone on the Kik network. Therefore, Kik users 
can easily connect with many people, even those they do not know personally. They can 
also do so with relative anonymity, since usernames do not reveal personal information 
such as first and last names, phone numbers, or email addresses. All of these qualities 
make Kik a particularly powerful weapon in ISIS's communication network and media 
dissemination. 
For those without mobile phones or access to social media, ISIS has a radio 
channel that broadcasts "Islamic State news" and propaganda. The radio station, called 
Al-Bayan, is reportedly broadcasted daily from Mosul, Iraq.30 Once a radio segment is 
released, it is quickly uploaded onto Youtube by social media users and circulated 
through Twitter. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Laura Sydell, “Pro-ISIS Messages Create Dilemma For Social Media Companies,” NPR, January 29, 
2015, accessed February 1, 2015, http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2015/01/29/382435536/pro-
isis-messages-create-dilemma-for-social-media-companies.  
30 Gilad Shiloach, “The Islamic State is Starting a TV Channel,” Vocativ, November 9, 2014, accessed 
February 4, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/nov/09/nasheed-how-isis-got-its-anthem. 
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 Figure 5. This graphic shows a Twitter post by user “@lance64” on February 5, 2015 at 5:16 a.m.  
Embedded in the post is a link to the ISIS radio segment for that day.  
  
 
Each radio segment, which is about 8 to 10 minutes long and recorded in clean Modern 
Standard Arabic, provides news of military and political developments in the Caliphate's 
many provinces. Each segment opens with a pro-ISIS nasheed, or Islamic vocal song, 
that continues to play throughout the duration of the news broadcast.  
According to western media sources, ISIS is also preparing to launch a TV 
channel that will provide continuous stream of ISIS propaganda.31 The purpose of 
establishing a radio station and TV channel is, firstly, to attract new recruits by providing 
constant information regarding the success of the Islamic State. More importantly, ISIS 
radio and TV bolster ISIS's image as a well-established and high-functioning political 
entity. The existence of daily radio and television programs suggest that ISIS has the 
necessary management structures and proper funding to support such programs. The use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Shiloach, “The Islamic State is Starting a TV Channel.” 
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of state-run media as a source of power is certainly not unique to ISIS or to jihadist 
organizations in general. Many powerful modern governments, including those in China 
and Russia for example, are finding “surprising (and alarmingly effective) ways to use 
media to help themselves stay in power.”32 Official, state-run media, evidently, is a 
necessary political weapon of any authoritarian regime, which ISIS leadership 
undoubtedly recognizes.  
Taken as a whole, ISIS’s media campaign is anything but arbitrary and 
undisciplined. It is complex and chaotic, but it is also well planned and remarkably 
sophisticated. ISIS, like other organizations around the world, uses social media to 
promote “brand awareness,” or to sell its image as a legitimate and sustainable 
organization.33 Unlike previous jihadist organizations, however, ISIS combines 
traditional forms of media dissemination, such as radio and web forums, with pop-
cultural mediums, such as Twitter, Youtube, and Kik, to launch one of the largest media 
campaigns in the history of jihadi communications. Recognizing how ISIS spreads its 
message is a critical first step towards understanding how ISIS operates intellectually. 
What is the message that ISIS is spreading? Through all of the re-tweets and 
hashtags, what is ISIS trying to communicate? It is tempting to dismiss ISIS media as 
mere propaganda, but this would not be an entirely fair characterization. In order to take 
ISIS seriously, we must recognize that its media campaign is not geared solely towards 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Christopher Walker and Robert W. Orttung, “Breaking the News: The Role of State-Run Media,” 
Journal of Democracy 25, no. 1 (2014): 71. 
33 Stafan, “ISIS Jumping from Account to Account, Twitter Trying to Keep Up,” Recorded Future, 
September 3, 2014, accessed February 26, 2015, https://www.recordedfuture.com/isis-twitter-activity/. 
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recruiting foreigners or invoking terror, although this is one of its objectives. More 
interestingly, and perhaps more importantly, ISIS media aims to project ISIS’s self-image 
as a legitimate political and religious institution. Thus, reports of military victories spread 
through ISIS publications and social media are often interlaced with Quranic citations or 
photo evidence of services being offered by ISIS members. All of this indicates ISIS’s 
desire to portray itself as “an organization capable of leading a state.”34 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Azmat Khan, “What ISIL’s English-language propaganda tells us about its goals,” Al Jazeera America, 
June 20, 2014, accessed January 29, 2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-
tonight/articles/2014/6/19/how-isil-is-remakingitsbrandontheinternet.html. 
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6. Obtaining Religious Legitimacy: 
Theological Themes in Dabiq 
 
How Islamic is the Islamic State? Since the summer of 2014, this question has 
dominated the international discussion about ISIS. Western media in particular is replete 
with debates concerning the authenticity and genuineness of ISIS’s religious beliefs. 
President Obama himself has refused to describe ISIS as Islamic, instead referring to the 
group as a band of terrorists who have betrayed Islam.1 Western political rhetoric reflects 
a degree of confusion about ISIS’s ideological identity. Such confusion, according to 
Graeme Wood, writer for The Atlantic, has led to a “well-intentioned but dishonest 
campaign to deny the Islamic State’s medieval religious nature.”2 “The Islamic State,” 
Graeme argues, “is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with 
carefully considered beliefs….”  
While it is tempting to accuse ISIS of being un-Islamic, it is important to 
remember that religious doctrine is susceptible to a myriad of different, and sometimes 
conflicting, interpretations. Thus, despite international efforts to discredit ISIS’s religious 
authority, ISIS continuous to draw support from religious zealots around the world. This 
is not to say that the majority of Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere support 
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radical interpretations of Islam. In fact, credible survey reports suggest the opposite is 
true.3 Nevertheless, ISIS’s claim to religious superiority is highly significant. It is thus 
important to recognize the theological themes present in ISIS media to fully understand 
whence ISIS derives its legitimacy.  
There is perhaps no better window through which we can determine ISIS’s self-
image than Dabiq, ISIS’s English-language magazine. As of March 2015, ISIS has 
published a total of 7 issues, each about 40 to 50 pages long and disseminated mainly 
through social media. When scrolling through Dabiq, one is immediately struck by its 
aesthetic appeal and sophistication. Each issue is filled with colorful, high definition 
photographs of burly militants and theatrical battles. These photos are usually surrounded 
by poetic text detailing military victories. In almost every issue, there is a story depicting 
life under the Islamic State, supported by images of smiling children or bright landscapes. 
Dabiq is undeniably attractive, leading analysts to believe that ISIS employs well-trained 
media experts equipped with expensive technology to design its publications.  
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Figure 6. Photographs of pages contained in the first issue of Dabiq.4 
 
 
Though Dabiq is published in English, it has been translated into French, German, 
Russian, and Arabic, thus making it accessible to a wider audience. The first issue of 
Dabiq, released in the summer of 2014, describes the magazine as “a personal magazine 
focusing on the issues of tawhid [monotheism], manhaj [the process of finding religious 
truth], hijrah [migration], and jama’ah [gathering or community].” It also contains “photo 
reports, current events, and informative articles on matters related to the Islamic State.”5 
These “informative articles” are usually reports of military advances, stories of groups or 
individuals pledging loyalty to Baghdadi, or excerpts of theological texts.  
Every issue also contains an extensive explanation of a theological concept ISIS 
deems important to its mission and style of governance. ISIS maximizes its religious 
legitimacy by quoting extensively from the Quran and the most trusted hadiths. Though 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Dabiq, “The Return of the Khalifah,” Dabiq no. 1 (Al Hayat Media, 2014): 11-40, accessed December 6, 
2014, http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-
khilafah.pdf. 
5 Dabiq, no. 1, “The Return of the Khalifah,” 3. 
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hadiths vary in credibility and authenticity, ISIS quotes almost exclusively from the 
sahihain, or body of works written by two of the most highly trusted authors, Imam 
Bakhari and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj.6 Dabiq thus serves a number of purposes. First, it aims 
to recruit westerners by detailing, and likely exaggerating, ISIS’s military successes. 
Second, it serves to portray the Islamic State as a stable political entity and a safe haven 
for Muslims around the world. Most importantly, Dabiq justifies the Caliphate through 
constant reference to Islamic texts and broad religious concepts, bolstering ISIS’s 
legitimacy. In order to grasp fully the power and allure of ISIS publications such as 
Dabiq, it is important to understand the various theological themes contained within 
them.  
One of the most powerful and prominent themes in ISIS media concerns salvation 
and the Final Hour. Based on careful analysis of Dabiq and related publications, it is 
clear that ISIS’s apocalyptic vision is one of the driving forces behind ISIS’s struggle. 
The title “Dabiq” is in itself a symbol of Armageddon, or the end of times. ISIS’s 
magazine is named after the town of Dabiq located in the northern countryside of Aleppo, 
northern Syria. According to the third issue of Dabiq, this town is the site of the 
Malhamah al-Kubra, or “Grand Battle,” against “the Crusaders.”7 The same article 
continues, “Abu Hurayah reported that Allah’s Messenger said, ‘The Hour will not be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Harleen K. Gambhir, “The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State,” Institute for the Study of War 
(2015): 6, accessed January 28, 2015, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/dabiq-strategic-
messaging-islamic-state. 
7 Dabiq, “The Liberation of Dabiq,” Dabiq, no. 3 (Al Hayat Media Center, 2014): 15, accessed January 6, 
2015, http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-3-the-call-to-
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established until the Romans land at A’maq or Dabiq…’” This battle, expected to take 
place in Dabiq, can be traced to a widely known hadith frequently quoted by Zarqawi.8 
Upon the Final Hour, the Muslims will be expected to battle the Romans and conquer 
Constantinople (Istanbul) and Rome. The battle in Dabiq is thus the first step towards the 
re-establishment of a global Islamic empire. This helps to explain the powerful 
symbolism contained in the cover of the fourth issue of Dabiq, which depicts the ISIS 
flag flying above St. Peter’s Square in Rome. This picture symbolizes ISIS’s plan to 
spread its empire throughout the world, and particularly into Rome, the home of the 
Crusaders.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Cover of the fourth issue of Dabiq, which depicts the ISIS flag 
flying above St. Peter’s square in Rome.9 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Michael S. Ryan, “Dabiq: What Islamic State’s New Magazine Tells Us about Their Strategic Direction, 
Recruitment Patterns, and Guerilla Doctrine,” The Jamestown Foundation, August 1, 2014, accessed 
January 22, 2015, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42702&cHash=0efbd71af77f
b92c064b9403dc8ea838#.VMEt52TF-gM. 
9 Dabiq, “The Failed Crusade,” Dabiq, no. 4 (Al Hayat Media Center, 2014), accessed January 7, 2015, at 
http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic-state/islamic-state-isis-magazine-Issue-4-the-failed-
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As the prophetic tale continues, Issa ibn Maryam, or Jesus in the New Testament, 
is expected to descend near Damascus to lead the Muslim army, along with the Mahdi, 
(the Islamic messiah), to battle the Antichrist, known in Islam as Dajjal.10  Following this 
final battle, only those deemed to be true believers would be saved. The third issue of 
Dabiq thus reads, “We ask Allah to place us in the camp of believers on the day of al-
Malhamah and keep us firm until he grants us either victory or Shahada [declaration of 
faith].”11 The town of Dabiq is of symbolic importance in the Islamic tradition and 
resonates particularly with those who share ISIS’s prophetic vision.  
It is no coincidence that American aid worker Peter Kassig was publicly executed 
in Dabiq, Syria. In a disturbing execution video released by ISIS, the British executioner 
Mohammad Emwazi, after referring to President Obama as “the dog of Rome,” explains, 
“Here we are burying the first American crusader in Dabiq, eagerly waiting for the 
remainder of your armies to arrive.”12 Given what we know about ISIS’s apocalyptic 
vision, the beheading of Peter Kassig was likely an attempt to draw American troops to 
Dabiq, facilitating the fulfillment of a prophecy. Assuming that ISIS members share this 
prophetic vision, it is unlikely that US military action in Syria will discourage ISIS. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ryan Mauro, “The Islamic State Seeks the Battle of the Apocalypse,” The Clarion Project, November 
18, 2014, accessed January 22, 2015, http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/dabiq-islamic-state-wants-
battle-end-days. 
11 Dabiq, no. 3, “The Liberation of Dabiq,” 15. 
12 Hannah Allam, “Peter Kassig’s friends hope unusual Islamic State video means he fought his 
beheading,” McClatchy DC, November 14, 2014, accessed January 22, 2015, 
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Rather ISIS supporters “will actually be encouraged by it because they believe it will 
ultimately bring victory.”13  
Publications such as Dabiq send a clear message: the ISIS struggle is not just 
about establishing an Islamic state here and now, but about saving Islam come the Final 
Hour. The use of apocalyptic rhetoric is not unique to ISIS; mention of the end of times 
can be seen in AQ propaganda as well. The end of times plays a more significant role in 
ISIS’s rhetorical strategy, however, because ISIS has control over the town of Dabiq. 
ISIS is thus more effectively able to convince fellow Muslims that the Final Hour is 
coming, and that the Islamic State will be the means of salvation when it comes. The 
successful establishment of the Islamic State is, in itself, indicative of the Final Hour, 
according to well-known hadiths.14 By providing accounts of apocalyptic battles 
prevalent in classic jihadi literature and religious texts, ISIS intends to associate the 
Islamic State with a higher cosmic purpose, enabling it to “capture the imagination of 
young warriors and inspire them to come and fight for the Islamic State.”15 Exploiting the 
allure of apocalyptic doctrine is one of the ways ISIS is able to maximize its political and 
religious authority.  
ISIS also uses apocalyptic doctrine to discredit western values such as freedom of 
religion. According to the second issue of Dabiq, the freedom to choose between right 
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14 Guy Taylor, “Apocalypse prophecies drive the Islamic State strategy, recruiting efforts,” The Washington 
Times, January 15, 2015, accessed February 4, 2015, 
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and wrong is a “polluted ideology” chosen only by those who regularly betray Islam.16 
Force is needed to keep the religion pure. This stringent dichotomy between right and 
wrong is highly characteristic of religious extremism. Interestingly, one writer in the 
second issue of Dabiq uses the example of the Prophet Nuh, or Noah in the Old 
Testament, to justify this black and white mentality. The author begins by explaining 
Noah’s choice between building an ark (thereby remaining faithful to God), and deviating 
from the truth, which would result in punishment (drowning in the flood and facing 
Hellfire on the Day of Judgment).  
The author then continues, “Had the proponents of choice contemplated all this, 
they would have realized that the flood was a clear sign of the falseness of giving 
choice…the flood was the result and consequence of opposing the truth…”17 As an entity 
of religious purity, the author explains, the Islamic State is a means of attaining salvation. 
It is, in other words, akin to Noah’s Ark, hence the title of the article, “It’s Either the 
Islamic State or the Flood.” Opposing the Islamic State, consequently, qualifies one as a 
perpetrator of “crimes against Islam and the Muslims.”18  
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Figure 8. Cover of the second issue of Dabiq, which features an article titled “It’s Either the 
Islamic State or the Flood.”19 
 
 
This line of reasoning justifies ISIS’s brutal takfiri ideology. Takfir is the practice 
of one Muslim declaring another an apostate or infidel. Most Muslims view takfir 
conservatively, believing that only God can determine whether one is a true believer. 
ISIS followers, however, consider themselves the only true Muslims and the rest 
unbelievers. They thus have a very narrow understanding of what it means to be Muslim: 
you either support the Islamic State, the only true manifestation of Islam, or you have 
defied God and opposed Islam, thereby making you an apostate. This line of thinking is 
how ISIS justifies its killing of other Sunni Muslims, an act that is otherwise strictly 
forbidden by the Quran and the Sunnah. Based on social media posts coming from ISIS-
held territories, so-called apostates appear to be the most common victims of execution.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Dabiq, “The Flood,” Dabiq no. 2 (Al Hayat Media Center, 2014), accessed January 5, 2015, , 
http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-2-the-flood.pdf. 
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In the fourth issue of Dabiq, ISIS combines takfiri ideology with its prophetic 
vision to justify its enslavement of Yazidis20 in Iraq. Based on the explanation presented 
in Dabiq, it is clear that ISIS takes seriously the grounds on which it declares one an 
apostate. According to an article titled “The Revival of Slavery Before the Final Hour,” 
students of Islamic law in the Islamic State were ordered to research the history of 
Yazidis in Iraq in order to determine whether Yazidis constitute apostates or mushrik 
(those guilty of shirk, or polytheism). These students determined that “this group 
[Yazidis] is one that existed since the pre-Islamic jahiliyyah [ignorance], but became 
‘Islamized’ by the surrounding Muslims population…although they never accepted Islam 
or claimed to have adopted it.”21 This is the basis on which ISIS determines Yazidis 
guilty of polytheism. The article claims to deal with them according to what “the majority 
of fuqqha [experts in Islamic jurisprudence]”22 have indicated.  
 “Unlike the Jews and Christians,” the author continues, “there was no room for 
jizyah23 payment.”24 Yazidis, the author explains, cannot be killed since they are not 
apostates, but as mushrikin, they must be punished. The author then explains ISIS’s 
decision to enslave the Yazidis, outlining a certain rules governing the proper treatment 
of slaves. A Yazidi mother, for example, cannot be separated from her child, and those 
who choose to convert to Islam must be accepted into the community. Finally, the author 	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21 Dabiq, no. 4, “The Revival of Slavery Before the Final Hour,” 15. 
22 Ibid.  
23 See chapter “The Islamic Caliphate: An Appeal to History” for an explanation of the jizyah tax. 
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mentions the revival of slavery as a sign of the Final Hour and as one of the conditions 
leading to the Final Battle. Thus, while the revival of slavery sounds backwards and 
barbaric to the modern ear, it nevertheless factors nicely into the prophetic narrative 
Dabiq seeks to promote.  
Interestingly, while the authors of Dabiq paint the Islamic State as a vehicle for 
salvation come the end of time, it nevertheless admits that the state, in its current form, is 
not perfect. In the third issue of Dabiq one author writes, “Keep in mind that the Khalifah 
(caliphate) is a state whose inhabitants and soldiers are human beings. They are not 
infallible angels…you may find mistakes that need fixing. You may find some of your 
brothers with traits that need mending…this is something that requires the allotment of 
many resources. So be patient.”25 Owning up to the fallibility of ISIS soldiers serves a 
number of purposes. First, by portraying the Islamic State as a work in progress, it 
suggests to potential ISIS sympathizers that they too can play a part in shaping and 
improving the state. Second, it prevents ISIS followers from associating ISIS militants 
with perfection, a trait that, according to Islamic tradition, is reserved for God alone. ISIS 
may also be using Dabiq to respond to criticism of ISIS found in mainstream media. 
In light of this fallibility of the Islamic State, Dabiq offers practical advice for 
Islamic State militants on how best to behave in accordance with Islam. In an article titled 
“Advice for the Soldiers of the Islamic State,” the author encourages soldiers to 
participate in their five daily prayers, avoid injustice, dishonesty, and temptation, and 
remain sincere to Allah in their actions and intentions. The author also demands that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Dabiq, no. 3, “Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity,” 33-34.  
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soldiers consult with Islamic scholars if they feel unsure of why they are engaging in 
jihad and warns against declaring takfir without absolute certainty and complete 
information.26  
One of the most striking features of Dabiq, and what sets ISIS’s ideology apart 
from other Islamic extremist groups, is its emphasis on hijrah (migration). Every since 
ISIS seized control of Mosul in the summer of 2014, ISIS’s media campaign has centered 
on encouraging Muslims around the world to migrate to the Islamic State. This suggests 
ISIS’s intention to establish a state with a sizeable and sustainable population. The word 
“hijrah” carries religious connotations that are worth noting. In Islamic tradition, “hijrah” 
refers to the migration of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to 
Medina in 622 CE, after which the first Islamic state was established. Thus, by 
encouraging its followers to “make hijrah,” ISIS is linking its cause to the example of the 
Prophet Muhammad.  
The third issue of Dabiq, titled “A Call to Hijrah,” contains an article devoted to 
explaining the religious necessity of migrating to the Islamic State. The author explains: 
So abandoning hijrah – the path to jihad – is a dangerous matter. In effect, 
one is thereby deserting jihad and willingly accepting his tragic condition 
of being a hypocritical spectator…but now there is a Khalifah (caliphate) 
prepared to accept every Muslim and Muslimah into its land and do all it 
can within its power to protect them while relying on Allah alone.27  
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Thus, the author claims, thousands of Muslims from all over the world and of all different 
backgrounds and ethnicities have flocked to Iraq and Syria in support of the Islamic 
State. The author even gives practical advice to those performing hijrah and comforts 
them by saying: 
Do not say to yourself, ‘I might get arrested.’ That fear is unsure and the 
obligation of hijrah is certain…do not worry about money or 
accommodations for yourself and your family. There are plenty of homes 
and resources to cover you and your family.28 
 
By presenting hijrah as a religious obligation and addressing the logistics of migration, 
ISIS is attempting to form a state with a permanent population of citizens. Migration, 
according to state formation literature, is one of the necessary requirements of early and 
modern statehood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Cover of the third issue of Dabiq, which demands the migration of Muslims 
to the Islamic State.29 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid, 33.  
29 Dabiq, “A Call to Hijrah,” Dabiq, no. 3 (Al Hayat Media Center, 2014), accessed January 6, 2015, , 
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ISIS’s media campaign is packed with blatant references to powerful religious 
narratives and themes, recognizable even to most non-Muslims. ISIS also uses quiet 
symbolism in its media campaign, however, representing a more subtle strategy aimed at 
capturing the attention of devout Muslims. The first issue of Dabiq, for example, contains 
an article titled “The Concept of Immah (Leadership) is from the Millah (Path) of 
Ibrahim." "Millah Ibrahim" translated literally means the path of the patriarch Ibrahim 
(Abraham). Millah Ibrahim is also the title of a popular book written by Abu Muhammad 
al-Maqdisi, a prominent Jordanian ideologue and spiritual leader of AQ. Though Maqdisi 
is little known to the average American, he is one of the most influential Islamic thinkers 
in the Jihadi-Salafi community.30 Due to his clarity of writing and deep knowledge of 
early Islamic texts, Maqdisi gained a massive following from among Jihadi-Salafi 
Muslims throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. In July of 2014, however, Maqdisi 
publicly condemned ISIS and the newly established caliphate, accusing ISIS of deviating 
from the principles of Islam and Islamic law.31 Thus, by referencing Maqdisi's book in its 
first issue of Dabiq, ISIS is likely trying to gain the favor of "al-Maqdisi’s followers and 
admirers over the head of al-Maqdisi himself."32 
ISIS’s rhetorical strategy is not the only thing that has drawn so many to the 
Caliphate. Music has contributed greatly to ISIS's lure and romantic aura. ISIS's 	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unofficial anthem, a nasheed called "My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared," has received a 
lot of attention, becoming one of the most popular anthems in the Islamic State and the 
soundtrack to most of ISIS's propaganda videos. Regardless of whether one supports ISIS 
or is familiar with Islamic music, ISIS's nasheeds are undeniably beautiful and catchy. 
Unlike other jihadist groups in the past, which tended to "recycle" old nasheeds, ISIS's 
Ajnad Media Foundation consistently produces original songs.33 ISIS nasheeds are also 
unique in the sense of hope, pride, and confidence they inspire in young ISIS 
sympathizers. For example, "My Ummah, Dawn Has Appeared" begins, in Arabic, "The 
Islamic State has arisen by the blood of the righteous, The Islamic State has arisen by the 
jihad of the pious…My Ummah, accept the good news, and don't despair: victory is 
near."34  
Just as ISIS nasheeds can be heard in the background of almost every ISIS 
propaganda video, the ISIS flag can be seen waving in the corner of almost every frame. 
The ISIS flag is recognizable to anyone who follows the news. Though similar in 
appearance to the flag of other Islamic extremist groups, the ISIS flag in particular is 
indicative of how ISIS views itself and how it wants to portray the Islamic State to the 
rest of the world. One of the most symbolically significant characteristics of the flag is its 
color. The flag’s solid black background is reminiscent of the Prophet Muhammad's war 
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banner. Thus, the flags of many other Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, and 
Kuwait, for example, contain the color black to reference the Prophet Muhammad.  
The black standard, as it is commonly referred to in Islam, can also be associated 
with the Abbasid Caliphate, which flew a black flag during its overthrow of the 
Ummayad Caliphate in 750 CE. The black standard is thus symbolic of the early Islamic 
period, a period that ISIS claims to mimic. The black banner also supports ISIS's 
apocalyptic vision. According to widely read hadiths, the raising of "black standards" is a 
sign of the final battle and of the return of the Mahdi.35 Magnus Ranstorp, Research 
Director at the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies and Swedish National Defense 
College, explains that the color black "is not just the color of jihad and of the caliphate, 
but it represents the coming of what some believers see as the final battle and the day of 
resurrection."36  
The writing on the ISIS flag is just as important as the flag's color. At the top of 
the flag, in rugged Arabic script (which in itself is suggestive of an earlier time), are the 
words "La 'ilaha 'ill-llah," which translates "There is not God but Allah." This is the first 
part of the Shahada, or the Islamic declaration of faith. Just below this phrase, one would 
expect to find the second part of the Shahada, which translates "And Muhammad is the 
messenger of Allah." Instead, there is a white circle with the phrase, "Muhammad, 
messenger of Allah" written in it. This symbolizes the seal that Muhammad is said to 	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have used on official documents and correspondence.37 Both the Shahada and the Seal of 
Muhammad are common symbols in Islam, and are not indicative of Islamic extremism. 
They do carry special weight on the ISIS flag, however, because they bolster ISIS's 
religious legitimacy and add a "veneer of historical authenticity to its mission."38 The 
ISIS flag thus symbolizes what ISIS believes to be the sacredness of its actions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The ISIS flag 
 
The secret appeal of ISIS stems largely from the theological themes present in 
ISIS publications and propaganda. From blatant religious references to subtle symbolism, 
ISIS is tapping into what psychologists call “cognitive closure,” or “the eschewal of 
ambiguity.”39 In other words, ISIS is able to dispel skepticism or uncertainty about the 
future by using religious rhetoric to justify its actions. By bolstering its credibility as an 
authentic Islamic state, ISIS is assuring its followers and potential supporters that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Arie W. Kruglanski, “Psychology Not Theology: Overcoming ISIS’ Secret Appeal,” E-International 
Relations, October 28, 2014, accessed March 13, 2015, http://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/28/psychology-not-
theology-overcoming-isis-secret-appeal/. 
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Islamic State is a means of attaining stability, truth, and salvation. Publications such as 
Dabiq play a critical role in strengthening this message. ISIS publications, images, and 
symbols are thus highly valuable because they allow us not only to see how ISIS views 
its own actions, but also how ISIS wants to portray itself to the rest of the world.  	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7. The Use of Violence  
 
It is difficult to hold a serious discussion about ISIS without addressing its use of 
brutality and relentless violence. ISIS has attacked, tortured, and killed civilians in nearly 
every province it controls, amounting to massive war crimes and human rights atrocities. 
Unlike most perpetrators of violence, however, ISIS does not try to cover up its crimes, 
but rather promotes them through its media campaign. ISIS’s use of violence is to some 
extent connected to the legacy of Zarqawi, who was known for his horrifying use of 
violence and came to be known as "the Sheikh of the Slaughterers" amongst fellow 
jihadists.1 It is also important to recognize how the public display of violence factors into 
ISIS's state building strategy. ISIS is diligent about justifying brutal acts with religious 
texts and stories of how Muslim leaders acted in the earliest days of Islam. ISIS is not 
acting based on religious concepts or theories as most Muslims do, but is attempting to 
"match its practices with the 'practical' history of Islam," mimicking the often brutal 
actions of early Muslim leaders.2 Though ISIS frequently refers to Islamic texts to justify 
its use of violence, there is nothing exclusively Islamic about the brutal and graphic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hassan Hassan, "ISIS has reached new depths of depravity. But there is a brutal logic behind it," The 
Guardian, February 7, 2015, accessed February 10, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/08/isis-islamic-state-ideology-sharia-syria-iraq-jordan-pilot. 
2 Hassan, "ISIS has reached new depths of depravity." 
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means with which ISIS kills. As Kalyvas points out, many different types of insurgent 
groups throughout history have used ISIS’s violent tactics.3  
Nevertheless, violence plays a very important role in ISIS's military strategy, 
particularly in its effort to gain control over new territory. A careful analysis of ISIS’s 
military strategy laid out in the first issue of Dabiq reveals that ISIS’s use of violence is 
inspired, at least in part, by a book called Idarat al-Tawahush, or Management of 
Savagery, by jihadi ideologue Abu Bakr Naji. This book is reportedly a part of ISIS's 
ideological curriculum and is widely read amongst ISIS leaders.4 In his book, Naji 
outlines a strategy for establishing a Sunni caliphate. He encourages jihadists to 
strategically inflict chaos by striking the country's crucial infrastructure and industries, 
such as oil fields and tourist sites. This will draw the country's security forces in and 
around such sites, thereby opening up security vacuums in other parts of the country. 
Insurgents can then move into these ungoverned areas and establish their own 
governments.  
In this first issue of Dabiq, ISIS outlines similar plans to weaken central 
governments through nikayah (terrorist tactics). Through acts of terrorism, ISIS will be 
able to inflict tawahhush (mayhem or chaos), the second stage of ISIS's strategy. By 
inflicting chaos, ISIS is able to consolidate its power in unstable regions and establish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Stathis N. Kalyvas, "The logic of violence in the Islamic State's war," The Washington Post, July 7, 2014, 
accessed February 3, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/07/the-logic-
of-violence-in-islamic-states-war/. 
4 Hassan, "ISIS has reached new depths of depravity." 
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new state-like structures. This final stage is referred to in Dabiq as tamkin.5 Thus, "what 
ISIS gains from violence, it calculates, trumps any losses in popularity.”6  
The public display of brutal acts, often intended for foreign governments, serves 
other purposes as well. Public brutality, firstly, can be attributed to ISIS's desire to 
receive ransom. By circulating video footage of beheadings, ISIS is assuring foreign 
governments that it will carry out its threats unless governments pay up. Secondly, and 
more importantly, ISIS's public use of violence "takes on a media significance that 
distorts our sense of ISIS’s power. In turn, we become more willing to accept their 
territorial claims, even ones that don’t stand up to serious analysis."7 In other words, 
public brutality is a way for the Islamic State to flex its muscles and to prove to its 
sympathizers abroad that, despite international efforts to defeat it, ISIS is still "winning."  
Thus, in an audio statement published by al-Furqan media, al-Adnani, the official 
ISIS spokesman, said,  
Everyone is watching, wondering in confusion and astonishment. They 
say, 'Does this make sense?! Is the Caliphate rising in the midst of our 
armies? Is Allah’s law being implemented despite our legions, arsenals, 
planes, tanks, missiles, aircraft carriers, and weapons of mass 
destruction...The Caliphate will remain, by Allah’s permission, until the 
Day of Judgment, for we are the followers of Muhammad (blessings and 
peace be upon him), and his followers will never be defeated."8  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Dabiq, "From Hjrah to Khalifah.” 
6 Hassan, "ISIS has reached new depths of depravity."  
7 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, "The Truth About ISIS…They're Better at Twitter Than War," Foundations for 
Defense for Democracies, January 8, 2015, accessed February 26, 2015, 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/gartenstein-ross-daveed-the-truth-about-isis-theyre-better-at-
twitter-than-war/. 
8 Pietervanostaeyen, "So They Kill and Are Killed" (audio statement by al-Adnani as-Shami), March 12, 
2015, accessed March 17, 2015, https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/category/isis/. 
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This statement supports ISIS's overall message that God is on the side of the Islamic 
State, and that despite airstrikes and ground troop invasions, the Islamic State will 
remain. Thus, regardless of ISIS's actual military capabilities, the media plays an 
extremely important role in promoting ISIS's purported or real military prowess and 
allows ISIS to more easily consolidate control over its territories. Public displays of 
brutality against westerners help to reinforce this message.  
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8. ISIS Governance Structures and 
 and Functions 
 
 
“LEND ME YOUR EARS” 
Despite its use of violence and emphasis on the end of days, ISIS does have other 
worldly concerns that center on the day-to-day governance of the territories it controls. 
Looking at how ISIS governs is extremely important. Western media and politicians tend 
to focus primarily on ISIS's military campaign, brutality, and the threat posed to the 
West. Ultimately, however, combatting the West is not ISIS's main concern. Careful 
analysis of ISIS propaganda suggests that ISIS is preoccupied with establishing systems 
of governance as a foundation for state building. The ability to establish governance 
structures in an otherwise chaotic and unstable region adds yet another layer to ISIS’s 
legitimacy and appeal. 
ISIS recognizes that "managing and governing territory requires a different skill 
set than conquering it."1 Through its media campaign, ISIS is able to convince its 
followers that it is capable of running a state and gaining the trust of its residents. One 
video series called “Lend Me Your Ears”2 plays a particularly important role in ISIS’s 
public relations strategy. Distributed by the ISIS media companies al-Hayat and al-
Furqan, “Lend Me Your Ears” acts as tourism series comparable to those shown on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ryan, "Hot Issue: Dabiq: What Islamic State's New Magazine Tells Us about Their Strategic Direction." 
2 The title “Lend Me Your Ears” is a reference to a speech given by Mark Antony in the play Julius 
Caesar, by William Shakespeare. The speech is a well known for its use of emotionally charged rhetoric 
and has been a model for propagandists throughout history. 
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Discovery Channel. British journalist John Cantlie, who was captured by ISIS in Syria in 
November of 2012, serves as the host in all of the videos. In the first video of the series, 
which was released in September of 2014, Cantlie is featured in an orange jumpsuit 
sitting behind a desk in a dark room. He looks calmly into the camera and admits right 
from the beginning that he is a prisoner and that he is speaking under duress. “But,” 
Cantlie continues, “seeing as how I've been abandoned by my government and my fate 
now lies in the hands of the Islamic State, I have nothing to lose." He later explains his 
intention to "show you [the viewer] the truth behind the systems and the motivation of the 
Islamic State, and how western media, the very organization I [Cantlie] used to work for, 
can twist and manipulate that truth for the public back home. There are two sides to every 
story. Think you're getting the whole picture?"3  
This powerful opening statement sets the tone for the rest of the video series, 
which portrays the Islamic State as somewhat of a utopia. The fact that a western 
journalist hosts “Lend Me Your Ears” is incredibly significant. In all of the videos 
following the first one, Cantlie appears to be in good health and spirits, walking 
comfortably through the streets of the Islamic State wearing western clothing and 
greeting friendly, and seemingly familiar, passersby. All of these details are intended to 
capture the attention of the West in particular, and to convince westerners that what they 
read in American or British newspapers regarding the Islamic State is biased and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 "John Cantlie Lend Me Your Ears," Youtube video, 3:21, posted by "Times of Lebanon," September 18, 
2014, accessed February 20, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vcew3qmidRI. 
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misleading. According to Cantlie’s opening remarks in the first video of the series, “Lend 
Me Your Ears” aims to reveal the “truth” behind the Islamic State.  
One episode in the series, released shortly after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 
Paris, shows Cantlie in Aleppo. Cantlie takes us through bustling street markets filled 
with colorful fruits and vegetables, into a mosque where children are learning to read and 
recite the Quran, and by large grain silos where employees are bagging wheat and selling 
it “at bottom low prices.”4 As Cantlie walks down one of the main streets in town, we see 
in the background children playing, families walking hand-in-hand, and ISIS residents 
building beautiful new homes and apartment buildings. Half way through the video, 
Cantlie brings us into the waiting room of a sharia court. He then proceeds to describe the 
meaning of sharia law, explaining, “It is the rule of God, the rule of Allah, and therefore 
it cannot be changed.” Unlike democratic laws, Cantlie continues, which are 
unpredictable and can change “every week,” Islamic laws are stable and “fairly simple.” 
For example, if one is convicted of robbery, he can expect that his hand will be cut off. 
“Sounds harsh,” Cantlie states, “but you’re not going to commit the same crime again, 
and it will dissuade others from doing the same.”5 Near the end of the video, Cantlie 
points out a small booth on the side of the road that disseminates “ISIS news.” These 
media stations, Cantlie explains, are meant to counter the distorted or outright false news 
coming from the West.6  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 "Islamic State Aleppo (British journalist John Cantlie)," Youtube video, 12:01, posted by "Today Islam," 
March 12, 2015, accessed March 15, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ru_ICj5l0NM. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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Figure 11. John Cantlie hosting an episode of “Lend Me Your Ears” in Aleppo.7 
 
The “Lend Me Your Ears” videos, like most ISIS media, are provocative and 
contain all the elements of classic propaganda. They should not be dismissed as unworthy 
of critical analysis, however. Videos such as “Lend Me Your Ears” reveal ISIS’s 
intention to maintain positive public relations. They also suggest that ISIS is a well-
organized state complete with administrative departments, religious offices, legal courts, 
and educational institutions. Thus, through its media campaign, ISIS is trying to convey 
to its viewers that the Islamic State is a permanent economic, political, and religious 
entity as opposed to a fanatical terrorist organization. Though ISIS’s governance strategy 
differs from one province to the next, in general, ISIS does appear to have established 
organized government structures. According to media analysis conducted by the Institute 
for the Study of War, the ISIS “government” is organized into administrative departments 
(including religious outreach and proselytization, education, local and religious police, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid..  
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and public relations), and Islamic services (which include everything from large 
infrastructure projects to humanitarian aid).8 
 
PUBLIC SERVICES 
Through its publications such as Dabiq, ISIS has demonstrated its ability to 
provide basic and complex services to those living under its control. In an article titled “A 
Window into the Islamic State” in the fourth issue of Dabiq, the author writes, “The 
soldiers of Allah do not liberate a village, town, or city, only to abandon its residents and 
ignore their needs.”9 Evidently, while the soldiers of the Islamic State are “sacrificing 
their lives and spilling their blood for His sake,” there is also an understanding amongst 
ISIS leaders that establishing a state requires its citizens be cared for.10 The article thus 
depicts many of the services the Islamic State provides for its members, including street 
cleaning services, a cancer treatment facility for children in Ninewa, and a “care home” 
for the elderly.11 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds, "ISIS Governance in Syria," Institute for the Study of War (2014): 
15-23. 
9 Dabiq, “A Window into the Islamic State,” no. 4, 27. 
10 I have not found any evidence indicating how ISIS selects those it cares for, though it is unlikely that 
ISIS provides services to non-Muslims. 
11 Dabiq, “A Window into the Islamic State,” no. 4, 28-29. 
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Figure 12. Page from the fourth issue of Dabiq, which describes public services offered  
by the Islamic State12 
 
 
Careful analysis of ISIS media suggests that ISIS participates in a wide range of 
public works projects, and has offices mandated to oversee these projects. One example 
can be found in “The Islamic State Report,” an ISIS journal published by al-Hayat every 
couple of months. The first issue of “The Islamic State Report” contains an informative 
article about ISIS’s “Office of Consumer Protection.” In the article, Abu Salih Al-Ansari, 
head of the Consumer Protection Office, explains that the Consumer Protection office is: 
 An office that’s concerned with protecting shoppers by inspecting the 
goods being sold in shops, markets, shopping centers and whole- sale [sic] 
outlets, discovering goods that are spoiled or not suitable for sale and 
taking those responsible to account. Likewise, we inspect restaurants and 
sweet- shops, and monitor slaughterhouses, so we can keep people from 
getting sick and guard against harmful substances."13  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Dabiq, “A Window into the Islamic State,” no. 4, 29.  
13 Islamic State Report, "On Patrol with the Office of Consumer Protection," no.1 (Al Hayat Media, 2014): 
5, accessed August 9, 2014, http://jihadology.net/category/islamic-state-report/. 
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ISIS also has offices mandated to maintain the safety and cleanliness of its roads, as 
indicated by a video released by ISIS’s Aleppo media office. In this video, titled “Work 
Service in the City of al-Bab and its Surroundings,” ISIS workers can be seen removing 
rubble and brush from the side of the road and sweeping dirt off of the streets.14 
ISIS has also demonstrated an interest in providing humanitarian aid and basic 
medical services. A photograph distributed through social media, for example, shows an 
ISIS fighter passing out winter clothing to children in Mosul.15 On January 2, 2015, 
Twitter user "@metesohtaoglu" posted a photograph of an advertisement for an ISIS 
medical school in Raqqa. That same month, ISIS’s media center in Aleppo released a 
video called “Medical Services in the town of Jarablus." In the video, Islamic State 
doctors offer of tour of a hospital in Jarablus, showing off the facility's operating rooms 
and stock of advanced medical equipment.16 Another photo report released from the ISIS 
media center in Raqqa shows ISIS fighters distributing zakat, or almsgiving, to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Jihadology, "New video message from the Islamic State: 'Work Service in the City of al-Bab and its 
Surroundings - Wilayat Halab'" (video), January 20, 2015, accessed February 8, 2015, 
http://jihadology.net/2015/01/20/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-work-service-in-the-city-of-al-
bab-and-its-surroundings-wilayat-%E1%B8%A5alab/.  
15 Jihadology, Instagram post, January 2015, accessed February 6, 2015, 
https://instagram.com/p/xuEI7ZMAO9/.) 
16 Jihadology, "New video message from the Islamic State: 'Medical Services in the City of Jarabulus - 
Wilayat Halab'" (video), January 16, 2015, accessed February 8, 2015, 
http://jihadology.net/2015/01/16/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-medical-services-in-the-city-
of-jarabulus-wilayat-%E1%B8%A5alab/. 
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needy17 while an ISIS report from Aleppo depicts ISIS employees distributing gas 
cylinders to residents throughout the town.18  
Aside from medical and humanitarian aid, ISIS appears to partake in more 
complex infrastructure projects as well. For example, photographs and videos released by 
the Islamic State show ISIS members setting up electrical lines19 and digging for sewage 
pipes.20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Video clip showing ISIS employees digging for sewage pipes in a Syrian 
neighborhood.21 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Al Platform Media, "The distribution of Zakat in Raqqa," February 3, 2015, accessed February 4, 2015, 
https://www.alplatformmedia.com/vb/showthread.php?t=77337. 
18 Al Platform Media, "The distribution of gas cylinders in Wilayat Halab," February 3, 2015, accessed 
February 4, 2015, https://alplatformmedia.com/vb/showthread.php?t=81195. 
19 Aymenn J Al-Tamimi, Twitter post, January 21, 2014, accessed November 16, 2014, 
https://twitter.com/ajaltamimi/status/425656210595909632. 
20 "Switching the main sewer pipes in the Salhin neighborhood," Youtube video, 2:45, posted by "Islamic 
Management of Public Services," November 20, 2013, accessed March 18, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=9U7546JfpUQ#t=94. 
21 Ibid. 
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These types of projects presumably require expensive equipment and a high level 
of expertise, indicating that ISIS has invested heavily into building and maintaining 
necessary infrastructure. Since 2013, ISIS has also maintained control over the Tabqa 
Dam in Raqqa, which has allowed ISIS to provide a large amount of water and electricity 
to its residents. ISIS manages a thermal power plant complex in Aleppo as well, which 
allows ISIS to generate industrial amounts of electricity. This complex represents "one of 
ISIS's largest governance undertakings, as operating the plant requires dozens of 
dedicated employees and a high level of technical expertise."22 A photo report released 
by ISIS in June of 2014 shows the plant to be operational and in good condition.23 
ISIS’s dedication to providing basic and complex services is all part of its 
campaign to win the trust of local residents and sympathizers abroad. We might compare 
this strategy to that of Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) in Yemen, which exploited the Yemeni 
government's inability to provide basic services to its citizens. Analyzing AAS's "hearts 
and minds" campaign in Yemen might in turn shed some light on what ISIS is hoping to 
accomplish through its media campaign. AAS is an organization comprised of militant 
Islamic groups, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In 2011, AAS 
seized control of several cities in southern Yemen and established emirates, or 
principalities, governed by Islamic law. In an online interview with senior AQAP cleric 
Abu Zubayr al-Abab, Abab described AAS's goals in Yemen as populist-oriented, stating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Caris and Reynolds, "ISIS Governance in Syria, 22-23. 
23 Justpaste.it, "The history, situation, borders, statistics, and fighting fronts," June 25, 2014, accessed 
March 18, 2015, https://justpaste.it/HalabReport. 
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the group's intention to find "solutions" to the biggest problems facing southern Yemen, 
including "the lack of public services such as sewage and water."24  
Soon after AAS took control, residents reported that that AAS was in fact 
providing services such as "food, gas, and fresh water to the local populations under its 
control."25 There is evidence that AAS provided basic legal services and established an 
Islamic court system,26 and propaganda videos distributed through jihadi web forums 
even show AAS providing electricity and building basic infrastructure.27 AAS soon came 
to be viewed as a stabilizing and relatively legitimate form of governance. As a result, 
residents living under AAS grew receptive of AAS’s harsh message and brutal, even 
violent, methods of control. 
 According to journalist Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, who spoke to AQ militants in the 
region, AAS learned from the failures of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in the early 2000s. 
Though AQI had an effective military campaign, it failed to win the trust of local Iraqis 
through public services and basic governance structures, undermining AQI's ability to 
maintain control over territory. This, according to Ghaith, influenced AAS's political 	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2012, accessed March 16, 2015, http://www.hudson.org/research/9779-ansar-al-sharia-and-governance-in-
southern-yemen. 
25 Simox, "Ansar al-Sharia and Governance in Southern Yemen." 
26 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, "Al-Qaida's wretched utopia and the battle for hearts and minds," The Guardian, 
April 30, 2012, accessed March 16, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/30/alqaida-yemen-
jihadis-sharia-law. 
27 Jihadology, "Madad News Agency presents a new video message from Ansar al-Shari'ah in Yemen: 
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strategy in Yemen. The similarities between AAS's "hearts and minds" campaign and 
ISIS's own propaganda campaign would suggest that ISIS also learned from the failures 
of AQI and is, to some extent, mimicking the example of AAS in Yemen. By providing 
its residents with a range of services, ISIS is attempting to gain the trust of its followers 
and present itself as a competent and legitimate government.  
 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
ISIS moves far beyond providing basic services, however. In its media campaign, 
ISIS advertises its well-established security and intelligence units, which are vital 
features of any modern state. An article in the sixth issue of Dabiq, for example, suggests 
that ISIS has a very strong intelligence wing. The article begins by describing the 
dismantling of the Khariki Cell, which, according to the article, was comprised of ISIS 
residents who were planning to attack ISIS fighters and the “Sunni masses, whom they 
consider mushrikin (idolaters).”28 The author explains that the cell was promptly 
identified, infiltrated by ISIS’s security apparatus, and dismantled. This article not only 
points to internal tension within ISIS, particularly between ISIS followers and ISIS 
leadership, but it also suggests that ISIS has a skilled intelligence wing capable of 
identifying those uncommitted to ISIS’s cause.  
We also learn from ISIS publications that ISIS has a both a local police force and 
a special police force known as al-Hisba, or religious police. Al-Hisba, according to an 	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ISIS report released on June 25, 2014, aim to “promote virtue and prevent vice to dry up 
sources of evil, prevent the manifestation of disobedience, and urge Muslims towards 
well-being."29 ISIS frequently releases videos and photographs of al-Hisba taking action 
against those activities believed to be “sources of evil.” For example, in early 2015, 
ISIS’s Raqqa media office released footage of al-Hisba confiscating “sinful” material 
such as cigarettes, alcohol, and drugs and setting them on fire.30  On April 1, 2015 (2:44 
p.m.), Twitter user Charles Lister (@Charles_Lister) posted photographs of al-Hisba 
setting fire to boxes of American-produced chicken that had been “slaughtered 
unlawfully.”31 Such media suggest that ISIS takes the Islamic code of ethics very 
seriously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. On April 1, 2015 at 2:44 p.m. Twitter user “@Charles_Lister” posted 
photographs of ISIS militants setting fire to America-produced chicken in Aleppo. 	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The second issue of “The Islamic State Report,” released in the summer of 2014, 
concludes with an interview with Abdul-Abbas Ash-Shami, head of the Islamic Police. In 
the interview, Ash-Shami explains that the work of al-Hisba "specifically deals with 
breaking up disputes…Most cases involve disputes and quarrels over property, ownership 
records, theft, threats, provocation, etc. Many of the cases we deal with are resolved 
without needing to refer them to the court."32 The author of the journal explains further, 
"They [al-Hisba] break up disputes and return the rights of the people back to them…they 
view everyone equally, like the teeth of a comb, with no difference between rich and 
poor, strong and weak. Everyone will have their rights returned to them…"33  
The author’s emphasis on “rights” and “equality” is consistent with rhetoric used 
throughout ISIS media. The first issue of Dabiq, for example, promises a new era of 
“honor” and “dignity” for the Muslims.34 These slogans are remarkably similar to slogans 
used in the Arab Spring, which centered on themes such as freedom, dignity, and social 
justice. It is no coincidence that ISIS alludes to similar themes, thus appealing to those 
caught up in the Arab Spring. ISIS’s emphasis on al-Hisba as arbitrators is also worth 
noting. Arbitration plays an extremely important role in Islamic tradition. In fact, the 
Prophet Muhammad’s ability to settle disputes in a just and fair manner is one of the 	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reasons he was so highly revered.35 Thus, the ability of al-Hisba to resolve conflict is 
particularly significant. The apparent size and diligence of al-Hisba "show how deeply 
ISIS is concerned about establishing and maintaining religious legitimacy."36 
According to its publications, ISIS also has local police forces that maintain day-
to-day security in their designated provinces. In a report released by ISIS's Aleppo media 
center, the local police forces serve as "the executive body for the court."37 ISIS police, 
according to well-known Twitter account "@MuntherJazrawi," wear special uniforms 
and regularly patrol towns in issued police cars as a means of maintaining internal 
security.38 ISIS’s apparent ability to provide a baseline sense of security in the territories 
under its control contributes heavily to ISIS’s legitimacy.  
 
EDUCATION 
Education may be one of the most important tools in state building, as it helps to 
establish a certain civic culture. ISIS publications and social media posts suggest that 
ISIS has invested heavily in education. For example, one photo report distributed through 
jihadi web forums shows children in the northern city of Kirkuk attending a school 
established by ISIS. Photographs show smiling children carrying backpacks, sitting at 
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desks in front of books, and playing in the school courtyard.39 Perhaps unsurprisingly, all 
of the children depicted in the photo report are male. According to al-Monitor, however, 
girls are able to attend school under the Islamic State, though schools are gender 
segregated.40 ISIS's emphasis on education reveals the group’s intention to establish a 
permanent population of loyal citizens who will grow up to become the next generation 
of ISIS leaders. Thus, "ISIS sees itself not as a terrorist organization indoctrinating 
children, but as a sovereign state educating its citizens."41 
Media reports suggest that ISIS has developed its own curriculum, which is 
overseen by ISIS's Bureau of Education. In August of 2014, the British-based Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights reported that ISIS had called a meeting with teachers in 
Raqqa to discuss a standardized Islamic curriculum, to be overseen by experts from the 
ISIS Bureau of Education. The Observatory also reported that "some IS sheiks" banned 
the teaching of any subject considered hostile to Islam, such as chemistry and 
philosophy.42 Later that fall, the Observatory reported that ISIS had shut down a number 
of schools in eastern Syria pending revisions to the curriculum and religious training for 
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the teachers.43 In February of 2015, photographs advertising ISIS’s alleged curriculum 
appeared on the Internet. Based on these photographs, the subjects comprising the 
curriculum include Arabic language, teachings on monotheism, mathematics, "natural 
sciences," and, interestingly, English language.44  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Photograph of one part of the ISIS curriculum45 
 
It is surprising that ISIS would choose to include non-Islamic subjects such as 
math, science, and English in its curriculum. However, given degree of control ISIS 	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appears to maintain over all aspects of its state, it is likely that even non-Islamic subjects 
of study are taught in line with Islamic principles. The ISIS curriculum also suggests 
ISIS's desire to equip residents with a well-rounded set of skills that are necessary to 
maintaining a high functioning state. In footage obtained by the Syrian Observatory for 
Human Rights, an Islamic State teacher explains, "We are not, as the West claims, an 
ignorant nation, but we are a people of knowledge. But we just teach the true science 
which is the Quran and the prophet encourage us to learn it[sic]."46 
ISIS has, nevertheless, proven itself resistant to modern and foreign intellectual 
influences. In late January 2015, according to western media sources, ISIS militants 
invaded the Central Library in Mosul and removed between 2,000 and 3,000 books 
pertaining to poetry, philosophy, sports, health, culture, and science, leaving only Islamic 
texts behind.47 Based on how ISIS has treated ancient artifacts over the last several 
months, it is likely that ISIS either destroyed the stolen books or sold them on the black 
market. By looting libraries and destroying ancient artifacts, ISIS is excluding "outside" 
influences and ideas, thereby dominating territory ideologically as well as militarily. The 
exclusion of foreign influences is consistent with Salafi tradition, which rejects bid’ah, or 
innovations, that conflict with precedents laid out in the Quran and Sunnah.   
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According to ISIS self-reporting, it has invested heavily in establishing Sharia 
institutes, which educate Islamic State residents on matters of religion. An official June 
2014 ISIS report on "Wilayat Halab” (Aleppo) states that ISIS had established 22 Sharia 
institutes in Aleppo alone.48 One can expect that number has since increased. ISIS Sharia 
institutes emphasize the importance of da'wah, or proselytization, under the Islamic State. 
The importance of da’wah is explained in the third issue of Dabiq. In an article titled 
“Da’wah and Hidbah in the Islamic State,” the author explains, "For what good is there in 
liberating a city only to leave its inhabitants steeped in misguidance and misery, suffering 
from ignorance and disunity, and disconnected from the Book of Allah and the Sunnah 
and His Messenger."49 Ideological and religious uniformity is just as important to the 
Islamic State as military domination. In an attempt to spread this message, ISIS posts 
many photographs of da’wah events on social media. For example, in January of 2015, 
ISIS released a photo collage depicting Islamic State fighters hosting a da’wah event in 
Tabqa, Raqqa. The photos show Islamic State fighters seen waving the ISIS flag, 
speaking into microphones, and marching alongside groups of children who appear 
captivated by their Islamic State teachers. Another photo report released by ISIS’s media 
office in Kirkuk shows a smiling Islamic State fighter distributing leaflets that advertise a 
da’wah event to passing cars.50 
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Figure 16. Photograph of an ISIS fighter distributing da’wah advertisements in Kirkuk.51 
 
ISIS WOMEN 
In addition to education, women play an important role in building a lasting 
caliphate. ISIS has thus made a significant effort to recruit women to the Islamic State. 
This reveals ISIS's intent to establish a permanent citizenry comprised of family units. A 
recent study conducted by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue concludes that over 500 of 
the 3,000 western Europeans believed to have migrated to the Islamic State are women.52 
Among the reasons that western women join the Islamic State, according to the report, 
and most widely cited amongst female social media users, is the desire to establish a 
caliphate, coupled with feelings of religious obligation. Thus, "ISIS's territorial gains and 
state-building project are crucial in attracting women, who can see they have an 
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important role to play in the new society."53 Evidence of women’s motivation to join the 
Islamic State can be seen on social media, which acts as tight-knit virtual community 
through which women can communicate.  
For example, on September 24, 2014, Tumblr54 user "Umm Ubaydah" responded 
to an anonymous user by saying, "We don't resort to violence because of the wrong 
America has done. We are trying to build an Islamic state that lives and abides by the law 
of Allah, which is Musat [obligatory] upon all Muslims." On December 6, 2014, Twitter 
user "@bintlad3n" posted, "the most important reasons the mujahideen came here was to 
reestablish the khalifah & be part of bringing back the honor to this ummah."55 It is clear 
that ISIS women are primarily responsible for recruiting other women to the Islamic 
State. Careful analysis of pro-ISIS social media reveals that the most active female ISIS 
recruiters are “Umm Ubaydah,” Twitter user “@bintlad3n,” and “Umm Layth,” whose 
Twitter and Tumblr accounts have mostly been suspended. 
ISIS women also distribute semi-official publications intended for women 
through social media. The media wing of the al-Khansaa Brigade, the all female ISIS 
militia responsible for spreading pro-ISIS propaganda and recruiting Western women, 
releases most of these publications. Official and semi-official ISIS publications suggest 
that women have a practical role to play in the Islamic State. In late 2014 and early 2015, 
for example, the al-Khansaa Brigade’s media wing distributed a number of semi-official 	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manifestos targeting women. These manifestos act as training manuals designed to 
inform women of their role in the Islamic State.  
According to the manifesto "Women in the Islamic State," the fundamental 
function for women in the Islamic State is "in the house with her husband and children." 
Exceptions to this include women's participation in "jihad (by appointment)" and 
"studying the sciences of religion." The manifesto also clarifies that "female doctors and 
teachers may leave [the home], but they must keep strictly to the Shariah guideline."56 
The manifesto also demands that women be educated, explaining: 
Yes, we say 'stay in your houses,' but this does not mean, in any way, that 
we support illiteracy, backwardness or ignorance. Rather, we just support 
the distinction between working - that which involves a woman leaving 
the house - and studying, as it was ordained she should do."57  
 
Accompanying photographs show young girls and women attending ISIS schools.  
In January of 2014, ISIS social media users also distributed a "handbook" that 
contains additional guidance for ISIS women. The manual places special emphasis on 
"raising mujahid children," asking that women "raise their children to be brave and 
loving, courageous and sensitive, and fearing no one but Allah." Additionally, women 
should "tell children bedtime stories of Shuhadaa and Mujahideen…get young children 
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interested in Jihad…" and familiarize them with "basic military training."58 Based on 
social media posts and ISIS documents distributed through social media, women are 
portrayed as having an important and active role to play in the Islamic State as wives and 
mothers. They are encouraged to move beyond the limits of social media and to 
contribute to the actual construction and implementation of the Islamic State. This 
weakens the image of ISIS as merely a group of male militants. Rather, through social 
media, ISIS is revealing its intent to establish a permanent citizenry comprised of close 
family units, including women and children, that subscribe to Islamic State ideology. 
 
LEGAL STRUCTURES  
When Baghdadi declared the restoration of the Caliphate in the summer of 2014, 
he placed heavy emphasis on encouraging judges and experts in Islamic law to join the 
Islamic State.59 Political scientists and legal experts have long understood that "law is an 
effective tool for legitimizing and maintaining political power in modern states…"60 
Thus, unsurprisingly, social media posts and propaganda suggest that ISIS governs 
according to legally binding rules.  	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In late January 2015, the ISIS media office in Kirkuk released a video that 
presents a tour of the main Islamic court in Kirkuk. The host of the video, an Islamic 
scholar of the court, explains the various activities of the court and introduces the viewer 
to a number of different offices responsible for implementing Islamic law. These offices 
include the "office of the judicial investigator," the "office of the judge," and the office 
that deals with those "under prosecution."61 This video not only emphasizes ISIS's strict 
adherence to "God's law," but it also suggests that ISIS has established the necessary 
legal structures to operate under such law with credibility and legitimacy. In December of 
2014, ISIS posted a legal document on the Internet listing crimes and associated 
punishments in the Islamic State. In this document, crimes range from "insulting Allah," 
which is punishable by death, to the drinking of alcohol, which earns 80 flogs.62  
Most recently, the Twitter user "@_umBack_" posted photos of 32 official ISIS 
fatwas, or religious judgments, that pertain to a range of subjects, including taxation, the 
treatment of prisoners, proper dress, organ transplantation, games, and recreational 
activities.63 Taken altogether, these fatwas cover a wide scope of affairs, addressing 
nearly every aspect of daily political and social life. They are therefore not intended as 
propaganda, but rather "provide a unique glimpse into life and politics in the Islamic 	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State."64 These fatwas also emphasize the fact that ISIS does not govern arbitrarily, but 
has an organized legal body (the Islamic State Sharia Council) developing the Islamic 
State's legal framework.  
Though reports of harsh punishment and torture in ISIS courts have leaked 
through social media, many civilians living under ISIS still consider ISIS courts more 
legitimate than the "corrupt courts" of the Assad regime.65 It is important to recognize the 
extent to which "residents of war torn areas may see the imposition of any law and order, 
even ISIS's particularly strict brand of sharia, as an improvement from a lawless, chaotic 
state."66 ISIS has used its court system to legitimize, and therefore monopolize, the use of 
violence. Whenever ISIS commits a violent act, a fatwa always follows soon after. For 
example, after ISIS claimed responsibility for the immolation of captured Jordanian pilot 
Moath al-Kaseasbeh, ISIS distributed a fatwa on the Internet that stated, "the Hanafis and 
Shafi'is [two of Sunni Islam's four schools or jurisprudence] permit burning."67 The 
Internet thus allows ISIS to remind its followers that its actions have legal backing. 
Violence and brutality during wartime is nothing new or surprising, but ISIS 
claims that even its militants are legally bound to the Islamic code of ethics. For example, 
ISIS reportedly sends legal jurists known as “shari’is” alongside its militants to ensure 
performance according to Islamic law while in battle.68 Social media posts also suggest 	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that ISIS combatants and scholars are held accountable for their “unjust” actions. In 
December of 2014, for example, photographs of a document released by ISIS in Aleppo 
circulated on social media to show that the Islamic State “does not accept any injustice” 
and that its Muslim civilians have the right to “raise their grievances through the court” if 
they feel they have been “subjected to injustice” by “the Islamic State soldiers and 
scholars alike.”69 In a widely circulated Youtube video, a man standing in what appears 
to be a court hall explains how he successfully brought charges against an ISIS emir for 
violating Islamic law.70 Then, in January of 2015, the British-based Syrian Observatory 
for Human Rights reported that ISIS had beheaded one of its own religious police 
officials for smoking, a practice deemed un-Islamic and therefore strictly banned by the 
Islamic State.71 Based on reports such as these, ISIS seems to hold even its own senior 
members accountable to the rule of Islamic law. ISIS likely has learned from Islamist 
groups in the past, many of which failed to gain local support following their use of 
indiscriminate violence and harsh illegal punishment. Political scientist Mara Revkin 
asserts that, "Insurgencies are more successful when they develop internal regulatory 
mechanisms to ensure that violence - however extreme and brutal it may be - is only used 
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according to well-defined rules and principles…"72 Through its media campaign, ISIS 
has revealed its intent to establish permanent judicial institutions and rulings, and has 
proven its ability to adjudicate disputes. This in turn helps ISIS gain political legitimacy 
and consolidate its power.  
 
ISIS ECONOMY 
Economic affairs factor heavily into ISIS’s state building strategy. Recent reports 
concerning ISIS's sources of income suggest that ISIS is extremely wealthy. ISIS receives 
some funds from private foreign donors, but the majority of ISIS's revenue comes from 
internal sources, such as oil sales, plunder, and ransoms. Estimates projected by the 
Unites States Treasury Department in the fall of 2014 states that ISIS earns about 1 
million dollars per day on black market oil sales.73 Kidnap for ransom also constitutes a 
significant source of income for ISIS. The U.S. Treasury estimated that ISIS made about 
20 million dollars in ransoms in 2014 alone.74 Analysts also suspect that ISIS earns a 
significant amount of money by collecting taxes, selling local resources such as wheat 
and fish, and engaging in criminal activities such as looting and bank robberies.75 All of 
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this information suggests that ISIS is able to fund itself and does not rely solely, or even 
primarily, on outside donors.  
It is especially interesting to note how ISIS flaunts its wealth as a means of 
obtaining state legitimacy and support from local residents. In one propaganda video that 
focuses on life in the city of Raqqa, Islamic State residents are interviewed. One man 
says that since the Islamic State came to Raqqa, nothing has been in short supply. He 
explains in Arabic, "Everything is present, thanks to God. Security, safety, electricity, 
water, work…all thanks to the coming of the Islamic State."76 Another video circulated 
through social media shows Islamic State residents in "Wilayat Halab," or Aleppo, selling 
fresh fruits in a crowded market, suggesting a booming agricultural sector.77 ISIS has also 
distributed a number of job advertisements through Twitter and web forums. For 
example, on January 31, 2015, Twitter user "Abu 3antar Britani" posted an advertisement 
for an English teaching position in the Islamic State. The post contains a photograph of 
the job description and the message, "Apply for full time or part time teaching in English. 
Enquire for your children too."78 In November of 2014, ISIS posted a job advertisement 
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seeking an “ideologically suitable” expert in oil operation, reportedly offering a salary of 
$225,000 to anyone capable of managing an oil refinery.79 On April 1, 2015, ISIS Twitter 
user “Abu Sa’eed Al-Britani” posted an essay, titled “Ten Jobs You Can Do In Dawlah,” 
which contains a list of job opportunities for non-fighters living under the Islamic State. 
Possible jobs include medical assistants, mechanics, Islamic police, chefs, and fitness 
trainers.80 Al-Britani’s essay suggests a shortage of working professionals in the Islamic 
State. The opportunity for employment is thus one contributing factor to ISIS’s overall 
appeal.  
In the fall of 2014, ISIS announced in its fifth issue of Dabiq that it would begin 
minting its own currency. In an article titled “The Currency of the Khilafah,” ISIS claims 
that its new currency, minted in gold, silver, and copper, is intended as "a significant step 
towards shifting the Ummah away from the usage of currencies that are no longer backed 
by any precious metals, and whose values are constantly manipulated by the central 
banks of their respective nations."81 The author goes on to explain that during the time of 	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the Prophet Muhammad and the Rashidun, the Caliphate minted its own currency, which 
was separate from that of the Persian and Roman Empires. Such currency contained 
Islamic images free from “shirki (relating to polytheism) connotations.”82 Based on 
photographs contained in Dabiq, coins minted by the current Islamic State are inscribed 
with the Islamic declaration of faith and important Quranic verses. Other images 
inscribed into ISIS currency include stalks of wheat, a spear and shield, and date palm 
trees. These images symbolize, respectively, the “blessings of the sadaqah (voluntary 
charity), the Muslim’s provisions from jihad, and Muslim’s deep-rooted faith, firm 
patience, and fruitful deeds.”83 ISIS currency carries significant theological weight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Image contained in the fifth issue of Dabiq, which depicts ISIS currency84 
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ISIS also mentions practical reasons for minting its own currency. The sixth issue 
of Dabiq, for example, features an article reportedly written by captive British journalist 
John Cantlie. In the article, Cantlie predicts a global financial meltdown and the demise 
of the U.S. dollar in the near future. Cantlie then explains ISIS’s decision to mint 
currency backed by gold, stating, “At such times, the world looks to something with a 
little more than paper to prop up its finances. That thing has to have intrinsic value, a 
value that does not climb or descend wildly at the pressing of a few buttons in a central 
bank."85 Because ISIS’s currency is backed by gold, however, "There is a finite amount, 
so it will never lose its value, banks can't just print more of it when they choose, and it's 
worth what the market says it is, not what the banks dictate…” “Now that’s real money,” 
Cantlie concludes.86  
By minting its own currency, ISIS is attempting to put itself ahead of the 
allegedly looming financial meltdown. Propaganda pieces advertising Islamic State 
currency also serve to portray ISIS as possessing a legitimate, and even divinely inspired, 
financial system. Meanwhile, the current world baking system, as argued by Cantlie in 
Dabiq, is “nothing but a scam designed to feed itself and governments.”87 ISIS’s decision 
to mint its own currency is also significant because it reveals ISIS’s intent to govern over 
the long term. Through its media campaign, therefore, ISIS is able to convince its 
followers that the Islamic State is economically successful and sustainable, a necessary 
feature of any modern state. 	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9. Conclusion 
 
This paper demonstrates that so much of ISIS’s appeal and subsequent strength 
stems from its claims to religious and political legitimacy. The Islamic State is viewed 
amongst its supporters not as a terrorist group, but as a sustainable and religiously 
ordained state. This view is perpetuated largely through pro-ISIS media. In the first 
month or two of researching this paper, ISIS was a mysterious figure. As ISIS became the 
center of western media's attention, however, we came to learn a lot more about ISIS, 
such as where it came from, how it is organized, and how it behaves. Many aspects of 
ISIS's state building strategy remain secret, but not its media campaign. ISIS media is 
intended to made public, to be heard and discussed. Thus, my decision to focus on ISIS's 
media campaign as one aspect of state formation was both an exciting and rational one.  
What role does ISIS’s media campaign play in ISIS’s current state building 
strategy? What do pro-ISIS media tell us about ISIS’s long-term goals? These questions 
guided the majority of my research. Never at any point in the process of writing this 
paper did I feel sympathy towards ISIS. ISIS is responsible for countless human rights 
atrocities, and the violence with which ISIS carries out its mission is undeniably 
repugnant. My investigation of ISIS’s media campaign, therefore, is not intended to 
justify ISIS’s actions, but rather to reach a deeper understanding of ISIS’s state building 
ambitions. The research presented in this paper allows us to draw a number of 
conclusions regarding how ISIS spreads its message, what that message entails, and how 
that message relates to ISIS’s overall state building strategy.  
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METHODS OF MEDIA DISSEMINATION 
ISIS is unique in the way that it combines traditional modes of media 
dissemination, including television, radio, and jihadi web forums, with pop cultural 
mediums, such as Twitter, Youtube, and Kik, to amplify its message. ISIS's use of 
Twitter is particularly interesting. ISIS is using Twitter as a primary means of media 
dissemination, making its distribution strategy decentralized, efficient, and highly public. 
Twitter makes it very easy for ISIS to reach an international audience in a relatively small 
period of time. As such, ISIS supporters all over the world can feel as though they are 
following ISIS closely and in real time. They can also actively promote ISIS simply by 
re-tweeting official or semi-official ISIS media posts. All of this gives pro-ISIS social 
media users the impression that they are participating in the development of the Islamic 
State, making them vulnerable to ISIS propaganda that demands their physical migration.  
The decentralized nature of ISIS's media campaign also makes it hard to suppress. 
While social media companies such as Twitter and Youtube have been diligent in 
suspending social media accounts they identify as being linked with ISIS, pro-ISIS social 
media users are able to create new accounts with relative ease. Thus, efforts to suspend 
pro-ISIS social media accounts have failed to slow ISIS's media campaign in any 
significant way. The decentralized nature of ISIS's media campaign also poses a potential 
threat to ISIS, since social media platforms such as Twitter make it relatively easy to 
spread false information. And yet, ISIS maintains a high degree of control over the flow 
of information. Pro-ISIS social media users appear to have formed hierarchical networks 
through which social media users disseminate ISIS publications and coordinate posts and 
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hashtags. These networks are well organized and methodical. ISIS is thus able to spread 
its message with ease, efficiency, and relative control.   
Thus, Anholt's theory concerning media and statecraft does not hold in the case of 
ISIS. According to Anholt, global media limits the ability of states to control the flow of 
propaganda and, therefore, to use it for political purposes.1 In the case of ISIS, however, 
global media has allowed ISIS to adopt a decentralized, though highly organized, media 
campaign. ISIS can thus spread its propaganda to a global audience with efficiency and 
relative control. This, in turn, fuels ISIS's political strategy.  
 
RELIGIOUS APPEALS 
There is much debate among scholars over where ISIS came from and why it 
behaves the way it does. Despite the diversity of their opinions, most political scientists 
view ISIS as a consequence of war, politics, or other material factors. While this view 
have some truth, it can often “obscure the independent power of ideas that seem, to much 
of the Western world, quaint and archaic…”2 Thus, a significant portion of this paper is 
devoted to analyzing the religious and ideological roots of ISIS. Much of the confusion 
concerning ISIS's ideological appeal stems, in large part, from a lack of appreciation for 
the seventh century Caliphate and all that it represents. The Caliphate was, and still is, 
considered by many to have been ordained by God as a protector of the faith. Memory of 	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the seventh century Caliphate is thus deeply embedded in Islamic culture and tradition. 
This memory would suggest that the Islamic State is not merely a reaction to geopolitical 
turmoil or a means of combatting the West. The Islamic State, and the historic notion of 
the Caliphate is, on some level, a desired end in itself. ISIS's appeal to the Caliphate in its 
media campaign, therefore, should not be taken lightly, as it is a major source of ISIS's 
legitimacy. 
ISIS is unique in that it is not just advocating the restoration of the Caliphate in 
rhetoric, as other Islamist groups have in the past, but is actually taking steps to revive the 
Caliphate in practice. Sovereign territory is a necessary requirement of any state or 
caliphate. By seizing and maintaining control over physical territory, ISIS is 
demonstrating that it is serious about re-establishing a caliphate and that God wills it to 
do so. Flaunting military victories and territorial gains in its media campaign emphasizes 
this message and reinforces ISIS's credibility. Territorial gains also strengthen ISIS' s 
argument for the religious necessity of hijrah, or migration. Now that the Caliphate has 
been sufficiently restored, as ISIS suggests in its media, it is the religious duty of every 
Muslim to migrate to the Islamic State and contribute to its construction and well-being.  
ISIS has dedicated much of its media campaign to explaining religious narratives 
and concepts that reach beyond the Caliphate itself. One of the most striking themes in 
ISIS's religious messaging concerns the end of days. Analyzing ISIS media leads to the 
conclusion that ISIS's apocalyptic vision plays an incredibly significant role in the way 
that ISIS behaves. Through its media campaign, ISIS is suggesting that the Islamic State 
is not only a means of governing worldly matters; it is also a means of attaining salvation 
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come the Final Hour. By convincing its followers that the Final Hour is near, and that the 
Islamic State is a means of being saved, ISIS is strengthening its argument regarding the 
immediate necessity of re-building the Caliphate. Actions taken on the part of ISIS, such 
as the revival of slavery or the seizure of Dabiq in northern Syria, for example, further 
play into the prophetic narrative conveyed in ISIS media. This, in turn, empowers ISIS to 
a degree that should not be underestimated. As Charles Kimball, professor of religious 
studies at the University of Oklahoma, notes:  
When a cataclysmic end is near, what else really matters? Everything 
about normal daily life pales by comparison. Public criticism of the group 
and family interventions simply reinforce the view that the evil world is 
hostile to the truth and the end is near.3 
 
The image of the Final Hour, consequently, is a powerful recruiting tool. Through its 
prophetic narrative and additional use of religious rhetoric, symbolism, and imagery, ISIS 
is able to justify its actions and strengthen its legitimacy.  
ISIS has undoubtedly carved out a state by force, supporting the conquest theory 
of state formation. However, the above findings suggest that ISIS is not motivated by 
purely material gains as conquest theorists such as Gumplowicz and Oppenherimer 
suggest.4 According to state formation theorist William Lilly, successful state formation 
requires both physical force and a widely accepted body of ideas.5 In other words, 
ideology is an important factor in state formation by force. Based on analyses of ISIS 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil: Five Warning Signs (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 
2002), 96. 
4 Franz Oppenheimer, The State, (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975), 8, quoted in Sicker, 70. 
5 Samuel William Lilly, Lilly, First Principles in Politics (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1899), 19. 
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media, it is clear that ideology is a powerful driver behind ISIS's state building strategy. 
Ideology, when coupled with its military campaign, helps to explain ISIS's success in 
carving out a state.  
The culture theory of state formation may also help to explain ISIS's success to an 
extent. According to theorists such as Anderson and Barkey, states form around a certain 
historical narrative or cultural identity.6 ISIS undoubtedly appeals to the Sunni Muslim 
identity and a historical narrative concerning the seventh century Caliphate as a means of 
drawing fellow Muslims to the Islamic State. According to ISIS, however, the Caliphate 
is more than just a protector of identity; it is a religious requirement. While the Caliphate 
appeals to a common identity and historical narrative, driving ISIS's state formation 
strategy, ISIS does not advocate voluntary construction of the Caliphate. Rather, ISIS 
portrays the Caliphate as being a religious obligation and an entity that all Muslims are 
required to participate in restoring. People traveling to the Islamic State must choose to 
submit to an entity that they view as having a higher cosmic purpose. Service's 
understanding of voluntary state formation, which implies that states form when people 
voluntarily submit to a person or entity they see as being an agent of the divine,7 thus 
holds true in the case of ISIS.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Malcom Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 1996), 31. 
7 Elman R. Service, Origins of the State and Civilization (New York: Norton, 1975), 294. 
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WORLDLY GOVERNANCE 
 Through its media campaign, ISIS has demonstrated a post-war mentality. It is not 
only concerned with fighting, but also with establishing an Islamic state and finding ways 
to sustain that state for generations to come. ISIS's military campaign, therefore, only 
scratches the surface of the group's overall strategy.  ISIS publications and social media 
posts suggest that its primary objective is to restore the Caliphate and to fulfill its self 
declared cosmic purpose. ISIS appears less concerned with combatting the West or 
engaging in grand sectarian war than with establishing a long-lasting state. Its use of 
brutality and gruesome killings, many of which occur along national and sectarian lines, 
are viewed by ISIS as a necessary means of reaching a desired end, namely, the 
restoration of the Caliphate. Through its media campaign, therefore, ISIS portrays itself 
as possessing many features of sustainable statehood.  
For example, ISIS has demonstrated its ability to provide public services, 
including humanitarian aid and complex infrastructure projects. Carneiro’s theory of 
environmental circumscription thus supports the case of ISIS. According the Carneiro, 
states form when populations voluntarily submit to a certain authority in exchange for the 
preservation and distribution of otherwise limited resources.8 ISIS’s monopoly on public 
services including water, electricity, and medical aid makes its residents dependent on 
ISIS for otherwise constrained resources. Carneiro’s theory of state formation helps to 
explain some people’s willingness to submit to the authority of the Islamic State. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 R. L. Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origin of the State," Science 169, no. 3947 (1970), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1729765?seq=1., 734. 
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Through its media campaign, ISIS has also demonstrated its ability to maintain 
order by providing local and religious security services, and by establishing a 
sophisticated legal system complete with sharia courts, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, 
and written rules of law. Thus, ISIS does not exist solely for the purpose of waging war 
as Tilly’s war theory of state formation suggests.9 Anslo’s understanding of war theory is 
more applicable to the case of ISIS. According to Anslo, states form as a means of 
fighting chaos (which is often caused by war) and imposing order.10 ISIS’s apparent 
interest in establishing a legal system and the rule of law demonstrates its intention to 
provide a sense of security and stability in an otherwise chaotic region of the world. 
ISIS media suggests that the Islamic State is economically stable and strong 
enough to withstand the post-war era. ISIS also appears to have taken an interest in 
educating children, having established schools and an "Islamic State curriculum." 
Women, according to pro-ISIS social media, are also important in educating the next 
generation of ISIS citizens, and thereby assume an active role in constructing and 
ensuring the sustainability of the Islamic State. ISIS's emphasis on Islamic education and 
on recruiting women demonstrates its aim to establish a permanent citizenry for the 
future. 
In the midst of fighting and chaos, ISIS portrays itself as methodically and 
effectively establishing a system of governance. But, it is difficult to verify the extent to 	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10 Christian Krohn-Hansen and Nunstad G. Knut, "Introduction," in State Formation: Anthropological 
Perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 20. 
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which ISIS actually functions in the way that is portrayed in its propaganda. According to 
political scientist Kai Hafez, states often use media to create a virtual reality that 
encourages people to interpret material reality in a certain way.11 Hafez’s theory 
concerning media and modern statecraft applies to the case of ISIS to some extent. Both 
the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Congressional Research Service have dismissed 
ISIS propaganda as false, noting enormous shortages in food, water, and medical services 
in ISIS-controlled territories.12 Nevertheless, media allows ISIS to convince its 
sympathizers that it not only has a post-war vision, but also a means of making that 
vision a reality. Perhaps more threatening than ISIS's military capabilities, then, is its 
ability to posture itself as a legitimate and sustainable state.  
 
IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings explained above amount to a single overarching conclusion: Media 
bolsters ISIS's political and religious legitimacy that, in turn, gives ISIS the fuel it needs 
to establish a lasting state. ISIS media acts as a vital instrument in ISIS's state building 
strategy. In order to combat ISIS, we must embrace ISIS propaganda as worthy of critical 
analysis. ISIS may be the biggest modern threat to world peace today, so trying to 
understand ISIS messaging on a deeper level is inevitably uncomfortable. It is 
nevertheless important that we take seriously ISIS's political and religious arguments, as 	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12 Congressional Research Service, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, 
Christopher M. Blanchard, Carla E. Humud, Rhoda Margesson, Matthew C. Weed, R43612 7-5700 
(February 11, 2015), 23-24, accessed March 21, 2015, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf. 
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failure to do so has very real practical consequences, such as preventing us from 
effectively combatting ISIS's recruitment strategy. In December 2014, the US 
Department of Homeland Security estimated that 2,700 westerners, including 100 
Americans, have travelled or attempted travel to the Islamic State.13 As of February 2015, 
according to a government testimony cited by the Associated Press, about 20,000 
foreigners from 90 different countries have travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight alongside 
ISIS.14 ISIS's ability to convince its sympathizers that it is more than just a terrorist 
organization, that it is a religiously ordained state capable of governing, continues to 
draw many to the Islamic State and strengthens ISIS's hold on the region.  
The ISIS dilemma is incredibly complex and cannot be sufficiently tackled by any 
one authority. Nevertheless, there are small steps that can be taken to begin mitigating the 
threat posed by ISIS. This paper demonstrates the necessity of combatting ISIS’s media 
campaign. So far, social media companies have taken a reactionary approach to 
combatting ISIS media by suspending accounts linked to ISIS as the appear on the 
Internet. One might describe this strategy as a game of Whac-A-Mole, suspending one 
pro-ISIS account only to have another appear minutes later. Social media companies 
ought to focus on infiltrating and eliminating the driving forces behind ISIS’s media 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ISIS and the Threat from Foreign Fighters: Written testimony of DHS Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Counterterrorism Policy Tom Warrick for a House Committee on Foreign Affairs Joint Subcommittee on 
the Middle East and North Africa, December 2, 2014, Department of Homeland Security, accessed March 
25, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/12/02/written-testimony-dhs-deputy-assistant-secretary-
counterterrorism-policy-house. 
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campaign, namely, ISIS’s social media networks. By identifying and targeting individual 
Twitter accounts, for example, that act as lead recruiters within these virtual networks, 
media companies might be able to begin dismantling ISIS’s larger social media 
campaign. This is not an easy approach to combatting ISIS’s media campaign, but it is 
one that should be further considered by social media analysts and ISIS foes. 
In the meantime, western governments ought to reconsider their counter 
messaging strategies. The US government’s current counter messaging campaign, led by 
the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, has proven largely 
ineffective. Counter messaging efforts will continue to fail so long as they overlook or 
belittle the historic and religious appeal of the Islamic State. Simply stating that ISIS is 
barbaric and immoral will not sufficiently turn people away from the Islamic State. In 
order to appeal to those who are vulnerable to ISIS propaganda, we must find a way to 
counter ISIS messaging with greater understanding of and sensitivity towards ISIS’s 
religious arguments. We cannot, and should not, undermine the significance of the 
Caliphate in Islamic tradition. Furthermore, western politicians and governments are in 
no position to define, interpret, or reform Islam. In forming a policy that deals with ISIS, 
we must consult with Muslim leaders and include Muslims in the decision-making 
process. Muslims have a unique perspective on the religious, historical, and cultural 
nuances of the Middle East that help to explain why ISIS has been so successful. They 
will be able to help governments develop a more informed approach to ISIS.  
Along these lines, western media ought to amplify the voices of Muslims leaders 
around the world who can offer honest and credible counter arguments to those presented 
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by ISIS. Muslim opposition to ISIS seldom makes headlines, but this does not mean that 
Muslims around the world are not speaking out. For example, on July 6, 2014, only days 
after Baghdadi announced the restoration of the Caliphate, the Syrian Islamic Council 
released a statement in which its members condemned ISIS as misguided and damaging 
to the reputation of Islam. They argued that ISIS bears no resemblance to the Rightly 
Guided Caliphs, and encouraged Muslims to seek guidance from qualified religious 
figures rather than from “those that merely inflame the theories of impressionable 
youths.”15 Even Abu Muhammad al-Maqddisi, a well-known Salafist preacher and 
spiritual leader of AQ, denounced ISIS for its extreme use of violence and its haste in 
establishing a caliphate. In his public letter addressing the Islamic State, Maqdisi asked, 
“Is this caliphate going to be a safe haven for all the vulnerable people and a shelter for 
every Muslim? Or will this name become a hanging sword over Muslims who disagree 
with them?”16  
Some of the most highly respected religious leaders in the Muslim world have 
also spoken out against ISIS. For example, Al-Azhar’s Grand Mufti, Egypt’s highest 
religious authority, denounced the Islamic State as “corrupt” and “a danger to Islam.”17 
Abdulaziz al-Sheikh, Saudi Arabia’s highest religious authority, labeled ISIS as the 	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“number one enemy of Islam.”18 Western Muslims have denounced ISIS as well. Muslim 
leaders in Britain, for example, publicly condemned the Islamic State, emphasizing that 
violence has no place in religion.19 The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), 
the largest Muslim advocacy group in the US, condemned ISIS as “morally repugnant” 
and a perpetrator of gross human rights violations.20 
These voices ought to stand at the forefront of counter messaging campaigns 
against ISIS. At the same time, Muslim leaders and scholars ought to unite in forming a 
cohesive religious argument aimed at discrediting ISIS. The Muslim community must 
exploit ijtihad, an Islamic legal principle that requires independent reasoning in the 
process of forming Islamic law. As one of the four sources of Islamic law in Sunni Islam 
(the others being the Quran, the Sunnah, and ijma, or the consensus of the Muslim 
community), Muslims scholars have an obligation to use reason when interpreting 
Islamic law. Muslim leaders ought to treat ijtihad as an opportunity to re-interpret Islamic 
principles that ISIS exploits to justify its actions. In this way, the Muslim community can 
begin to chip away at ISIS's political and religious legitimacy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Al Jazeera, "Islamic State is our top enemy: Saudi mufti," Al Jazeera, August 19, 2014, accessed 
February 9, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/islamic-state-our-top-enemy-saudi-
mufti-2014819165435845901.html. 
19 Aine Fox, "ISIS concern: British Mulsim leaders condemn extremist group," Independent, July 11, 2014, 
accessed March 26, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/isis-concern-british-muslim-
leaders-condemn-extremist-group-9599273.html. 
20 CAIR, "CAIR Condemns ISIS Violence and Rejects Calls to Join Extremists Fighting Abroad," Council 
on American-Islamic Relations, July 7, 2014, accessed March 26, 2015, http://www.cair.com/press-
center/press-releases/12551-cair-condemns-isis-violence-and-rejects-calls-to-join-extremists-fighting-
abroad.html. 
154	  	   	  
ISIS should not be viewed as an isolated issue that can be combatted in one fell 
swoop. ISIS is only part of a much larger set of issues concerning religious extremism 
and the conditions that fuel religious extremism. This research, therefore, represents the 
tip of the iceberg, addressing only one aspect of a complex issue that warrants further 
exploration. ISIS is a formidable force that is unlikely to disappear any time soon. 
Despite coalition airstrikes targeting ISIS-held areas, ISIS continues to hold onto key 
territory. Based on a map produced by the Coalition for Democratic Syria (CDS) on 
January 10, 2015, ISIS continues to maintain control of nearly one third of Syria, or 
double the amount of territory it controlled in August of 2014.21 Perhaps of more concern 
is the number of people that ISIS now governs. According to CDS, in the two months 
following coalition airstrikes alone, thousands of Syrians who had previously lived under 
moderate opposition are now living in territories controlled by ISIS.22 ISIS has proven 
itself a skilled military organization during wartime. Its ability to govern, to establish a 
political and religious entity strong enough to endure the post-war era, will be the real 
challenge for the future.  
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Appendix I: 
Map of Iraq and Syria 	  	  
 
 
Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/asia/iraq-syria-map.html 
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Appendix II:  
Map of ISIS Presence in Syria  
 
 
 
Source: http://www.thedailybeast.com/content/dam/dailybeast/2015/01/13/150113-mak-syria-map-jan-
embed.jpg  
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Appendix III:  
ISIS Sanctuary Zones in Iraq and Syria  
 
 
 
Source: http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/2015/03/isis-sanctuary-march-4-2015.html 
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